Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking Ltd

In an automated transaction, the contract is made when the customer takes the irrevocable step which operates the machine. Terms first communicated on a ticket issued afterwards cannot alter that contract; the ticket is ordinarily a voucher or receipt.

A party relying on an exclusion clause must show that the other party knew of the particular term or received reasonably sufficient notice of it before contracting. The more unusual, onerous or destructive of rights the term, the more explicit the notice required. A general reference to conditions does not adequately notify a customer of an exclusion of liability for personal injury caused by negligence.

The claimant parked his car in the defendants’ automated multi-storey car park. After he returned to collect it, he was seriously injured in an accident. Mr Justice Mocatta found that each party was equally at fault and awarded damages.

The defendants appealed without challenging the findings about the accident. They relied on a ticket issued by the machine and on displayed conditions which purported to exclude liability, including liability for personal injury. The central issues were when the parking contract was made and whether the exclusion condition had been incorporated by adequate notice.

Disposition

1. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The defendants could not rely on the exclusion condition.
2. Automatic contracting. Lord Denning MR held that the contract was concluded when the claimant drove to the entrance and caused the automatic machine to operate. The entrance notice was the offer, and the claimant’s irrevocable act was acceptance. A ticket subsequently issued could not add a term excluding liability for personal injury. Sir Gordon Willmer agreed that conditions introduced after the machine had been irrevocably operated could not succeed. Lord Justice Megaw reserved a final view on the precise moment of formation, but reached the same result on notice.
3. Notice of the particular exclusion. On the alternative ticket analysis, the company had to show either that the claimant knew that the ticket referred to the relevant exclusion condition or that it had done what was reasonably sufficient to notify him of that condition. The burden lay on the company. The claimant knew that the ticket contained printing, but did not know that it referred to contractual conditions, and the company had not established the contrary.
4. Onerous terms require conspicuous notice. The condition was embedded in lengthy printed conditions and purported to exclude liability for personal injury caused by the occupier’s negligence. Such a far-reaching restriction, which removed a right otherwise conferred by the Occupiers Liability Act 1957, required a clear indication before or at the time of contracting that a personal-injury exclusion was proposed. A general reference to conditions displayed elsewhere was insufficient.
5. The notice at the entrance, including the statement that cars were parked at the owner’s risk, did not notify the claimant of an exclusion for personal injury. The condition was not incorporated.

• Court of Appeal: The defendants’ appeal was dismissed with costs.
• High Court: Mr Justice Mocatta, on 18 June 1970, found the claimant and the defendants each half responsible for the accident and awarded damages. The defendants appealed only on their asserted contractual exclusion.