Coleen Properties Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government

[1971] 1 WLR 433

Case details

Case citations
[1971] 1 WLR 433 · [1971] EWCA Civ 11 · [1971] 1 All ER 1049
Court
Court of Appeal
Judgment date
26 January 1971
Judgment text

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Subjects
Administrative law Compulsory purchase Judicial review of statutory decision-making
Keywords
compulsory purchase clearance area added land Housing Act 1957 reasonably necessary sufficient evidence inspector’s report planning judgment ultra vires quashing order
Outcome
appeal allowed (unanimous)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Compulsory acquisition of adjoining land requires evidence showing that acquisition is reasonably necessary for the satisfactory development or use of the cleared area. A local authority’s assertion is insufficient. The issue is ordinarily one of fact, or planning judgment based on evidence, rather than an unfettered matter of policy. Where an inspector has reached a factual conclusion after inspecting the site, the Minister may reverse it only if the record contains sufficient material to justify the contrary conclusion. The Minister must decide whether the particular land is necessary for the development or use actually proposed, not whether acquiring it would produce a tidier or more comprehensive scheme.

Factual background

The appellants owned Clark House, a modern property adjoining two rows of houses declared to be clearance areas by the London Borough of Tower Hamlets. The authority sought to include Clark House as added land in a compulsory purchase order made under the Housing Act 1957, relying on section 43(2).

After a public inquiry, the inspector concluded that acquiring Clark House was not reasonably necessary for the satisfactory development or use of the cleared area and recommended its exclusion. The Minister rejected that recommendation, stating that exclusion would seriously inhibit redevelopment of the surrounding rectangular block. Mr Justice Lyell upheld the decision. The appeal concerned whether the Minister had sufficient evidence to reverse the inspector and whether the statutory power extended to this acquisition.

Held

  1. Appeal allowed. The compulsory purchase order was quashed so far as it related to Sidney Street and Clark Street. Clark House was not compulsorily acquired. Costs in the Court of Appeal and below were ordered against the Minister; there was no order against the London Borough of Tower Hamlets.
  2. Under section 43(2) of the Housing Act 1957, adjoining land may be acquired only where the authority establishes that its acquisition is reasonably necessary for the satisfactory development or use of the cleared area. The local authority bore the burden of producing evidence. Its bare assertion that Clark House was necessary did not satisfy that burden.
  3. Per the Master of the Rolls, the question whether acquisition is reasonably necessary is an inference of fact, not planning policy. The Minister could overrule the inspector on planning policy, as in Lord Luke’s case, but could not reverse the inspector’s factual recommendation without sufficient material. The Court could intervene where the Minister acted without evidence, reached a conclusion unsupported by the evidence, misconstrued the statute, considered irrelevant matters, omitted relevant matters, or otherwise erred in law, following the approach stated in Ashbridge Investments Ltd v Minister of Housing and Local Government.
  4. Lord Justice Sachs agreed. The Minister was confined to the material on the record and could not rely against the owner on undisclosed expert material within the Ministry without informing the owner and providing an opportunity to address it. The inspector could rely on evidence obtained by inspecting the site. The evidence did not show that retaining Clark House would obstruct housing redevelopment, reduce the number of dwellings, materially increase costs, deprive residents of necessary amenity, or require land for road widening.
  5. Lord Justice Buckley agreed. The Minister had wrongly focused on developing the whole rectangular island, including the school site, rather than on whether Clark House was necessary for the development or use of the land included in the order. The Minister therefore acted ultra vires.
  6. The court did not need finally to resolve the meaning of “cleared area”. The authorities indicated that the expression was not necessarily confined to the clearance area itself, but it did not confer an unlimited power to acquire any adjoining land which the authority desired.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal: Allowed the appeal and quashed the compulsory purchase order to the stated extent.
  2. High Court: Mr Justice Lyell affirmed the Minister’s decision on 7 April 1970.
  3. Public local inquiry: The inspector recommended that Clark House be excluded, but the Minister rejected that recommendation on 25 October 1968.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed (unanimous)

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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