R v Lawrence (Alan) (Lawrence v Metropolitan Police Comr)

The offence of theft comprises dishonest appropriation of property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it. The prosecution need not prove that the owner withheld consent.

An appropriation may occur despite the owner’s permission or consent. Consent remains relevant to dishonesty: a person who believes that the owner, fully informed of the appropriation and its circumstances, has agreed to it does not act dishonestly.

Property belongs to another if it belonged to that person when it was appropriated, subject to the extended statutory meaning. Theft under section 1(1) and obtaining property by deception under section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 are not mutually exclusive.

The appellant taxi driver took £6 from the open wallet of an Italian visitor who spoke little English, in addition to £1 already handed to him. He then drove the visitor to his destination. The lawful fare was approximately 10s 6d.

The appellant was convicted of theft under section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal but certified points of law of general public importance and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

The central questions were whether section 1(1) required an appropriation without the owner’s consent and whether offences under sections 1(1) and 15(1) were mutually exclusive. The appellant also argued that consent to taking the money transferred its ownership and therefore prevented it from being property belonging to another.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Viscount Dilhorne delivered the substantive speech. Lord Donovan, Lord Pearson, Lord Diplock and Lord Cross of Chelsea expressly agreed with his reasons.

2. Per Viscount Dilhorne, section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968 contains four elements: dishonest appropriation; property; belonging to another; and an intention permanently to deprive the other of it. Parliament deliberately omitted the former requirement that property be taken without the owner’s consent. The prosecution therefore need not prove absence of consent.

3. Per Viscount Dilhorne, section 3(1) provides that any assumption of an owner’s rights amounts to appropriation. An appropriation can occur although the owner permits or consents to the taking. The appellant assumed an owner’s rights when he took the money from the wallet.

4. Per Viscount Dilhorne, consent and belief in consent may nevertheless bear upon dishonesty. Under section 2(1), appropriation is not dishonest where the accused believes that the owner would consent if fully aware of the appropriation and its circumstances. A person who believes that the fully informed owner has actually agreed to the appropriation likewise does not act dishonestly. The evidence did not establish agreement to pay a sum greatly exceeding the lawful fare, and there was ample evidence of dishonesty.

5. Per Viscount Dilhorne, “belonging to another” in sections 1(1) and 15(1) asks whether the property belonged to another when it was appropriated or obtained, subject to section 5’s extended meaning. The money belonged to the passenger when the appellant took it. The appellant’s intention permanently to deprive him of it was undisputed.

6. Per Viscount Dilhorne, offences under sections 1(1) and 15(1) are not mutually exclusive. The same conduct may satisfy both theft and obtaining property by deception, although some cases fall within only one offence. The appellant was properly charged under section 1(1).

7. Viscount Dilhorne further observed that leave under section 1(1) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 requires both a point of law of general public importance and a point which ought to be considered by the House. Although the certificate omitted the latter conclusion, it could be inferred from the grant of leave.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed the appellant’s appeal unanimously and upheld his conviction for theft.
2. Court of Appeal: Dismissed the appeal against conviction, certified two points of law of general public importance and granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. No citation is stated in the judgment.
3. Trial court: Convicted the appellant of theft contrary to section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968. The court and citation are not stated in the judgment.