Hunt v Broome (Broome v Director of Public Prosecutions)

The statutory immunity for peaceful picketing protects attendance at or near the specified place when undertaken only for a permitted purpose. It does not confer a right to stop or detain another person, obstruct a vehicle, or compel anyone to listen.

A picket may invite a person to stop and may continue communicating or persuading while that person remains willing to listen. If the picket also intends to prevent the person from proceeding, the attendance is no longer solely for a protected purpose. It therefore falls outside the immunity and may constitute wilful obstruction of a highway.

During a national building workers’ strike, a trade union official asked a lorry driver to stop and sought to persuade him not to deliver a load. When the driver attempted to enter the building site, the official stood in front of the lorry and refused requests to move.

The Stockport justices dismissed an information alleging wilful obstruction contrary to section 121 of the Highways Act 1959. They considered that section 134 of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 authorised the official to make the driver stop and listen for a reasonable period. On an appeal by case stated, the Divisional Court set aside the acquittal and remitted the case with a direction to convict.

The central issue before the House was whether section 134 gave a picket who deliberately stopped a vehicle for peaceful persuasion a defence to the highway-obstruction charge.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon each concluded that section 134 of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 afforded no defence. Lord Hodson agreed with Viscount Dilhorne. The Divisional Court’s direction to convict therefore stood.
2. Per Lord Reid, section 134(2) protected only attendance falling within section 134(1). A picket could invite a driver to stop and could attempt peaceful persuasion while the driver remained willing to listen. The section did not imply a right to constrain or detain the driver. Such a right would impose a corresponding duty to stop or remain, which required clear statutory words.
3. Per Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Parliament deliberately confined the immunity to attendance “of itself” and to attendance undertaken “only” for the specified purposes. The appellant’s purpose extended beyond peaceful persuasion because he also required and compelled the driver to remain stationary. Reading a reasonable power of detention into the provision would contradict its language and create uncertainty.
4. Per Viscount Dilhorne, section 134 protected attendance which might otherwise be criminal or tortious. It did not confer a power to interfere with another person’s lawful use of the highway. Pickets could invite persons or vehicles to stop, but compulsion removed the attendance from the statutory protection because it introduced an additional, unprotected purpose.
5. Per Lord Salmon, the statutory immunity was narrow but effective. It protected attendance alone, not independently unlawful words or conduct committed while attending. A construction permitting private citizens to stop highway users and compel them to listen would seriously restrict personal liberty and could not be implied without express and unambiguous language.
6. Lord Reid considered that attendance by an unreasonably large number of pickets could support an inference that their purpose included preventing free passage. Lord Salmon regarded the purpose of such a crowd as a fact-sensitive question and reserved any concluded view because that issue did not arise for decision.

1. House of Lords: Dismissed the picket’s appeal and left standing the Divisional Court’s direction to convict.
2. Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division: Allowed the prosecutor’s appeal by case stated, set aside the justices’ decision and remitted the case with a direction to convict. It certified a point of law of general public importance and granted leave to appeal.
3. Justices for the County Borough of Stockport: Dismissed the information under section 121 of the Highways Act 1959, holding that section 134 of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 permitted the picket to make the driver stop and listen for a reasonable period.