Horrocks v Forray

A licence to occupy a home provided by one partner for a mistress and her child is not contractual merely because accommodation and financial support were provided over many years. The claimant must establish a meeting of minds, sufficiently certain terms and an intention to create legal relations. A contract may be inferred without express words, but the inference depends on the circumstances. A continuing relationship of natural love and affection, generous voluntary support and general statements about future provision may point away from contractual intention. The approach in Tanner v Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 is fact-sensitive and does not create a general right to remain in occupation. Where no contractual licence is proved, the owner’s executors may recover possession.

Arthur Edward Leslie Horrocks and John Stephenson Lloyd, as executors of William Charles Ayshford Sanford, claimed possession of 7, Farm Place, Kensington, occupied by Maxine Forray and her children. Sanford had owned the house and had provided accommodation and financial support to Forray, his long-term mistress, and their daughter. Forray accepted that she had no proprietary interest but contended that her permission to occupy was a contractual licence binding on Sanford’s executors.

The West London County Court, before His Honour Judge McDonnell, rejected that contention and ordered possession. Forray appealed to the Court of Appeal, relying principally on Tanner v Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346. The central issue was whether the circumstances justified inferring a binding agreement allowing her to remain in the house for life, while the daughter was of school age, or while accommodation was reasonably needed.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The defendant had failed to establish any contractual licence. Vacant possession was ordered within 28 days, with costs, subject to the stated limitation concerning costs incurred after 13 October 1975.
2. Per Lord Justice Megaw, Tanner v Tanner [1975] 1 WLR 1346 decided only that a contract could be inferred on the particular evidence in that case. It did not establish that a mistress who had been provided with accommodation necessarily acquired a continuing right to occupy it. The inference there arose from circumstances including the woman’s surrender of a rent-controlled flat as part of the arrangement.
3. Whether express or implied, a contract requires a meeting of minds, contractual terms reasonably clearly defined and an intention to affect the parties’ legal relationship. A contract may be inferred even though no express offer or promise was spoken.
4. On the facts, Sanford’s long-term provision of accommodation, money and a relatively luxurious lifestyle did not justify inferring a binding promise concerning 7, Farm Place. General statements that he would eventually provide a house, and an intention to provide security if he died, were insufficient. The continuing relationship and the absence of a sufficiently certain agreement pointed away from an intention to create legal relations. Megaw LJ left the separate question of consideration undecided, although he regarded it as a further difficulty.
5. Lord Justice Scarman agreed that there was nothing contrary to public policy in parents agreeing contractual arrangements for the maintenance of their child and mother, rather than resorting to the Affiliation Proceedings Act 1957. But the existence of obligations capable of contractual regulation did not justify inferring that the parties had made such a contract. The continuing relationship and Sanford’s voluntary generosity made contractual intention unreasonable to infer. Lord Justice Bridge agreed with both judgments.

• Court of Appeal: dismissed the appeal from the West London County Court and upheld the possession order made by His Honour Judge McDonnell.
• West London County Court: rejected the alleged contractual licence and ordered possession.