Director of Public Prosecutions v Luft (Director of Public Prosecutions v Duffield, Duffield v Director of Public Prosecutions)

Expenditure incurred to prevent the election of a particular candidate may be expenditure incurred with a view to promoting the election of the remaining candidate or candidates. Liability under sections 63 and 95(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act 1949 does not require an intention to benefit one identified candidate.

The relevant desire need only be one reason which induced the expenditure; it need not be the person’s dominant intention. Persuading electors not to vote for one candidate ordinarily improves the collective prospects of the others. An attack on a candidate’s political views can also amount to disparagement. An acquittal is nevertheless required if a reasonable doubt remains whether preventing the candidate’s election formed any part of the accused’s intention.

During the October 1974 general election, the respondents distributed anti-National Front pamphlets in three constituencies. The pamphlets urged electors not to vote for National Front candidates but did not recommend any particular alternative candidate. The respondents were charged under sections 63 and 95 of the Representation of the People Act 1949.

A Manchester stipendiary magistrate acquitted Luft and Atkinson because they had not intended to promote one particular candidate. Bolton justices took the opposite view and convicted Duffield. On appeals by case stated, the Divisional Court upheld the acquittals and quashed Duffield’s convictions.

The House considered whether expenditure intended to prevent the election of a particular candidate could satisfy section 63 despite uncertainty or indifference about which rival candidate would benefit.

1. The consolidated appeals were allowed unanimously in relation to the charges under sections 63 and 95(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act 1949. Lord Diplock delivered the leading speech. Lord Salmon, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Russell of Killowen agreed with it.

2. Per Lord Diplock, the substitution in section 63(1) of “with a view to” for “for the purpose of”, and of “a candidate” for “any candidate”, did not change the meaning of the predecessor provision. Those changes were stylistic consequences of rearranging and expanding the provision. Parliament would not be taken to have displaced the established construction in R v Hailwood [1928] 2 K.B. 277 by apparently synonymous language.

3. The offence does not require a dominant intention to promote or procure a candidate’s election. It is enough that the desire to do so was one reason which played a part in inducing the expenditure. Cases concerning fraudulent preference under section 48(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1883 were not reliable guides because their construction was influenced by the previous law.

4. “Promoting” a candidate’s election means improving that candidate’s chances of election. Where more than two candidates stand, persuading electors not to vote for one ordinarily improves the collective prospects of the others. Accordingly, an intention to prevent one candidate’s election involves an intention to improve the chances of the remaining candidate or candidates, even if the person is indifferent about which rival succeeds.

5. Section 63(1)(c) was not confined to attacks on a candidate’s personal character or conduct. “Disparaging” bears its ordinary meaning. A candidate may be disparaged by attacks on the political views which that candidate holds.

6. Lord Fraser added that preventing the candidate’s election might conceivably form no part of the person’s intention, particularly where the candidate was believed to have no prospect of election and the persuasion served another purpose. If a reasonable doubt remained on that issue, the accused had to be acquitted.

7. The findings concerning the respondents’ intentions supported convictions under sections 63 and 95(1)(c). The House did not restore Duffield’s conviction under section 95(1)(b), because that legally distinct charge had not been argued or addressed by the Divisional Court.

1. House of Lords: The consolidated appeals were allowed unanimously in relation to sections 63 and 95(1)(c) of the Representation of the People Act 1949. Duffield’s conviction under section 95(1)(b) was not restored.

2. Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division: Dismissed the appeal against the acquittal of Luft and Atkinson and allowed Duffield’s appeal against conviction. It certified a point of general public importance. Leave to appeal was subsequently granted by the House of Lords.

3. Bolton Magistrates Court: Convicted Duffield and imposed a £10 fine for each offence.

4. Manchester City Magistrates Court: Dismissed the charges against Luft and Atkinson because an intention to promote one particular candidate had not been proved.