Hirani v Hirani

Duress invalidates consent to marriage where threats, pressure or other coercion overbear the individual’s will and destroy the reality of consent. The test is not confined to threats to life, limb or liberty. The court must assess the pressure in its factual and personal context, including the person’s dependence and practical alternatives. Entering a marriage to escape a disagreeable situation does not, without more, establish duress.

A 19-year-old wife appealed from the dismissal of her undefended petition for nullity. The Divorce Registry judge accepted her evidence that her parents had arranged a marriage to a man she had never met and had pressured her to proceed, threatening that she must marry him or leave the family home. The judge considered that the evidence did not show a threat to life, limb or liberty. The central issue before the Court of Appeal was whether that was the correct legal threshold for duress invalidating consent to marriage.

1. The appeal was allowed and a decree nisi was pronounced. Lord Justice Ormrod delivered the reasoned judgment, with which Lord Justice Watkins and Mr Justice French agreed.
2. The governing question was whether the threats, pressure or other coercion destroyed the reality of consent and overbore the individual’s will. Duress was not restricted to threats to life, limb or liberty.
3. The passage from Szechter v Szechter 1971 P 286 contrasted a merely disagreeable situation with a real threat. It did not impose a requirement that a threat to life, limb or liberty had to be proved in every case.
4. The court applied the formulation in Pao On v La-g Yiu Long 1930 AC 614 that duress, whatever its form, is coercion of the will which vitiates consent. In a marriage case, the pressure must be evaluated in its factual and personal context.
5. On the facts, the wife was wholly dependent on her parents, had no practical place to go or means of supporting herself, and was compelled to marry a stranger despite her opposition. Her will had therefore been overborne and her consent vitiated.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal allowed. The dismissal was set aside and a decree nisi pronounced.
2. Divorce Registry — On 11 February 1982, His Honour Judge Roger Willis dismissed the wife’s undefended petition for a decree of nullity on the ground of duress.