R v Caldwell (Comr of Police of the Metropolis v Caldwell)

For criminal damage, a person is reckless where an act creates an obvious risk of the relevant harm and the person either gives no thought to that risk or recognises it and nevertheless proceeds. The risk must be one which would engage an ordinarily prudent person and must not be so slight that it could reasonably be disregarded.

Under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, self-induced intoxication may be relevant where the prosecution alleges an intention to endanger life. It is irrelevant where recklessness as to endangering life is alleged, provided that the risk would have been obvious to the defendant when sober.

The respondent, while voluntarily intoxicated, set fire to a residential hotel following a grievance against its proprietor. He pleaded guilty to arson under section 1(1) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, but denied the aggravated offence under section 1(2), which required an intention to endanger life or recklessness as to whether life would be endangered.

The recorder directed that self-induced intoxication was no defence and the jury convicted. The Court of Appeal quashed that conviction, while leaving the three-year sentence in place as an appropriate sentence for the lesser offence. The Commissioner appealed on whether self-induced intoxication could be relevant to intention or recklessness under section 1(2)(b).

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. The House affirmed the Court of Appeal's order because the remaining criticisms of the summing-up had not been argued and the result made no practical difference to the respondent. The certified questions were nevertheless answered by a majority of three to two in the terms proposed by Lord Diplock.

2. Per Lord Diplock, with Lord Keith of Kinkel and Lord Roskill agreeing, “reckless” in section 1 of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 bears its ordinary meaning. A person is reckless if the act creates an obvious risk of the relevant harm and the person either gives no thought to that possibility or recognises some risk and nevertheless proceeds. Whether the risk was obvious, and whether it was too slight to deter an ordinarily prudent person, are relevant. The gravity of the possible harm is also important. The contrary Court of Appeal cases were overruled.

3. Per Lord Diplock, liability under section 1(2) must be considered in stages. The prosecution must first establish intention or recklessness as to destroying or damaging property under section 1(2)(a). It must then establish intention or recklessness as to endangering life under section 1(2)(b).

4. Per Lord Diplock, the distinction between offences of specific and basic intent does not govern where recklessness is an alternative sufficient mental element. Following Regina v Majewski [1977] AC 443, self-induced intoxication is no defence to recklessness. Unawareness caused by intoxication is immaterial where the risk would have been obvious to the defendant when sober.

5. The majority therefore answered that intoxication may be relevant where the charge alleges only an intention to endanger life. It is irrelevant where the charge alleges, or also alleges, recklessness as to whether life would be endangered.

6. Lord Edmund-Davies disagreed on both the meaning of recklessness and intoxication. He considered that recklessness required actual foresight of the relevant risk and that aggravated arson involved a further, specific mental element to which intoxication could be relevant. Lord Wilberforce agreed with his proposed answers. Both nevertheless agreed that the appeal should be dismissed.

1. House of Lords: Affirmed the Court of Appeal's order and dismissed the Commissioner's appeal. By a majority, it held that self-induced intoxication is irrelevant where recklessness as to endangering life is alleged.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Quashed the conviction under section 1(2) of the Criminal Damage Act 1971, but left the three-year sentence unchanged as an appropriate sentence for the section 1(1) offence.

3. Central Criminal Court: Convicted the respondent of aggravated arson under section 1(2), following a direction that self-induced intoxication was no defence. He had pleaded guilty to the lesser section 1(1) offence.