R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte Alexander (Alexander v Immigration Appeal Tribunal)

Immigration rules are policy guidance and should be construed sensibly, according to the natural meaning of their language, rather than with the strictness applicable to statutes or statutory instruments.

Under rule 21 of the applicable student rules, an immigration officer who is satisfied that an applicant genuinely and realistically intends to study retains a discretion to admit the applicant for a short period even though another requirement in rules 18 or 19 is unmet. Those requirements include an intention to leave the United Kingdom after completing the course. Failure to establish that intention therefore does not remove the discretion.

A Sri Lankan citizen sought leave to enter the United Kingdom for a three-year course. Her entry clearance had been obtained by material deception, but the immigration officer accepted that she genuinely and realistically intended to study. He refused admission because, among other matters, he was not satisfied that she intended to leave after completing her studies. He considered that he consequently had no discretion under rule 21 of the Immigration Rules to admit her for a short period.

An adjudicator allowed her appeal, but the Immigration Appeal Tribunal reversed that decision. The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's determination and directed reconsideration on the basis that the discretion existed. The Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed the Divisional Court; Oliver LJ dissented. The central issue before the House was whether rule 21 conferred the disputed discretion despite the applicant's failure to establish an intention to leave.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Roskill delivered the leading speech. Lord Diplock, Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Brandon of Oakbrook and Lord Brightman agreed with it and would also allow the appeal.

2. Per Lord Roskill, rules 18 and 19 together contained five requirements for a student seeking entry clearance: acceptance for a qualifying course; study occupying the whole or a substantial part of the student's time; sufficient means; an ability and intention to pursue full-time study; and an intention to leave after the course. The expression “requirements of the preceding paragraphs” in rule 21 naturally referred to all the requirements in both rules 18 and 19.

3. Per Lord Roskill, the word “requirements” had to bear the same meaning in both places where it appeared in rule 21. The distinction drawn in the Court of Appeal between the requirements in rule 18 and the supposed prohibitions in rule 19 had no foundation in the language. The majority construction in the Court of Appeal impermissibly restricted the rule 21 expression to rule 18 alone.

4. Per Lord Roskill, immigration rules are not construed with all the strictness applicable to a statute or statutory instrument. They provide guidance to immigration officers and express general policy concerning the operation of immigration legislation. They must therefore be construed sensibly according to the natural meaning of the language employed.

5. Per Lord Roskill, once the immigration officer was satisfied that the applicant genuinely and realistically intended to study, the last sentence of rule 21 permitted short-period admission at the officer's discretion even though another requirement in rules 18 or 19 was unmet. This included failure to satisfy the officer of an intention to leave after the course. No additional mandatory departure requirement could be built into the genuine-study threshold. Rule 12 of the separate control-after-entry rules did not assist the contrary construction.

6. The Court of Appeal's decision was reversed and the Divisional Court's order restored. The Tribunal's determination was quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration on the basis that the discretion existed. How that discretion should be exercised remained entirely for the Tribunal.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was allowed unanimously. The Court of Appeal's decision was reversed, the Divisional Court's order restored and the matter remitted to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.

2. Court of Appeal: By a majority, Lord Denning MR and Watkins LJ allowed the appeal and held that no discretion existed. Oliver LJ dissented and agreed with the Divisional Court.

3. Divisional Court: Donaldson LJ and Forbes J quashed the Tribunal's determination and remitted the matter, holding that rule 21 conferred a discretion to admit the applicant for a short period.

4. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: The Tribunal allowed the immigration officer's appeal and reversed the adjudicator.

5. Adjudicator: The applicant's appeal against refusal of leave to enter was allowed.