R v Heron (R v Thomas)

The offence of falsely making or counterfeiting a current gold or silver coin under section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936 was an offence of basic intent. The prosecution had to prove an intention to produce the article which was made and which resembled a current coin. It did not have to prove an additional dishonest purpose, an intention to pass the coin as genuine, or an intention to defraud.

Where a real and substantial difficulty or ambiguity arises in construing a consolidating statute, the court may consult its legislative history. Such recourse may identify the distinct statutory mischiefs underlying apparently overlapping provisions.

The three appellants conspired to produce coins resembling current gold half-sovereigns. The prosecution offered no evidence about their intended use. After the trial judge ruled that section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936 required no dishonest intent beyond an intention to make the coins, the appellants changed their pleas to guilty and were convicted.

The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) dismissed their appeals but certified whether counterfeiting under section 1(1)(a) required an element of dishonest intent. It refused leave to appeal, which an Appeal Committee of the House subsequently granted.

The issue before the House was whether the subsection required an intention to pass the counterfeit coins as genuine or to defraud, or merely an intention to make coins resembling current coins.

1. The consolidated appeals were dismissed unanimously. Lord Simon of Glaisdale, Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Scarman each concluded that section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936 required no proof of an intention to deceive, defraud or pass the coins as genuine. Lord Wilberforce agreed with all the speeches, and Lord Bridge of Harwich dismissed the appeals for the reasons already given.

2. Per Lord Simon, the offence was one of basic intent rather than specific intent. The prosecution had to prove that the accused intentionally made an article resembling a current coin. The expressions “falsely makes” and “counterfeits” described the production of a spurious coin and did not necessarily import fraud. This construction was supported by the contrast between section 1(1)(a) and provisions which expressly required an intention to achieve a further purpose, including section 5(6), which used the words “with intent to defraud”.

3. Per Lord Russell, section 1(2), under which the offence could be complete before the coin was fit to be uttered or fully made, sat uneasily with any requirement of a further dishonest intention. Section 2 also showed that the legislation treated the intentional production of an article resembling a current coin as sufficient. Section 1(1) was directed at making a false or counterfeit coin, and no more.

4. Per Lord Simon and Lord Scarman, section 8 did not establish that section 1(1)(a) required a distinguishing dishonest intent. The provisions had different legislative origins. Section 8 derived from legislation addressing medals resembling current coin, whereas the offence of falsely making coin had existed independently for centuries. The apparent overlap was therefore consistent with the character and history of the consolidating Act.

5. Lord Scarman added that legislative history may be consulted where the language of a consolidating statute presents a real and substantial difficulty or ambiguity which ordinary methods of construction cannot resolve. This approach applies to pure consolidation, consolidation with minor corrections, and consolidation incorporating Law Commission amendments. The historical material in this case confirmed the construction otherwise preferred from the statutory context.

6. The replacement offence in section 14 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 was expressed in materially different terms. The House’s construction of the repealed 1936 provision therefore did not determine the meaning of the new offence.

1. House of Lords: The consolidated appeals were dismissed unanimously, and the orders of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) were affirmed.

2. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appellants’ appeals against conviction were dismissed. The court certified a point of law of general public importance but refused leave to appeal.

3. Trial court: The judge ruled that section 1(1)(a) of the Coinage Offences Act 1936 did not require proof of a dishonest intention. The appellants then changed their pleas to guilty and were convicted.