P Perl (Exporters) Ltd v Camden London Borough Council

An occupier does not ordinarily owe an adjoining occupier a duty to secure premises against trespassers who might use them to enter and damage the adjoining property. Liability for the independent wrongdoing of a third party generally requires a special relationship, such as control over the wrongdoer, or another recognised source of responsibility.

The foreseeable possibility of criminal conduct does not by itself create such a duty. Where third-party intervention is otherwise relevant, responsibility requires a high degree of foreseeability. An occupier's failure to lock or secure premises therefore does not, without more, make the occupier liable for thieves who enter neighbouring premises and steal property.

The defendant council owned adjoining premises at 142 and 144 Southampton Row. The plaintiff company occupied No 142 and stored clothing in its basement. A vacant basement flat in No 144 was insecure and had been entered by unauthorised persons.

Thieves entered No 144, broke through the 18-inch wall separating the basements and stole more than 700 garments from No 142. A deputy High Court judge held that the council had failed to take reasonable care and awarded the company £12,338.93 in damages.

The council appealed. The central issue was whether an occupier owes an adjoining occupier a common law duty to secure its premises against trespassers who might obtain access to, and steal from, the adjoining property.

1. The appeal was allowed unanimously. The council owed no duty to the plaintiff to secure No 144 against thieves who might use those premises to enter No 142. Judgment for the plaintiff was therefore set aside, with costs.

2. Waller LJ held that responsibility for the acts of independent third parties is exceptional. Control or another special relationship may supply the necessary basis for responsibility. Where the defendant has no control over the third party, the court must approach the proposed liability with caution. Although third-party conduct may sometimes remain within the scope of a duty, it requires a high degree of foreseeability and not merely a foreseeable possibility. The particular conduct here—entering a vacant basement, breaking through an 18-inch wall and stealing clothing—did not meet that standard.

3. Oliver LJ held that Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office (1970) AC 1004 did not establish a general duty whenever third-party wrongdoing was likely. Its duty arose from the special relationship of control between the defendant and the wrongdoers. Geographical proximity, knowledge of valuable goods, awareness of earlier trespass and the simplicity of fitting a lock did not create an equivalent relationship. Foreseeability alone could not impose the claimed duty.

4. Oliver LJ distinguished cases involving invitees or contractual obligations. He declined to follow Evans v Glasgow District Council (1973) S.L.T. 17 insofar as it supported a general duty to secure vacant premises against vandalism affecting neighbours. That case involved materially different allegations, including positive alterations and damage to the claimant's premises, and had only determined that the pleadings justified factual inquiry.

5. Robert Goff LJ reached the same conclusion through the two-stage approach in Anns v Merton London Borough Council (1978) AC 728. Even where entry through unsecured neighbouring premises might reasonably be foreseen, the independent criminal wrongdoing and absence of a special relationship were considerations negating the proposed broad duty. He left open the possibility of liability in other circumstances, including where a defendant supplies an obvious or very likely wrongdoer with the means of committing the wrong.

1. Court of Appeal: Allowed the council's appeal unanimously, with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. High Court, Queen's Bench Division: A deputy High Court judge awarded the plaintiff £12,338.93 in damages for negligence. No citation for that decision is stated.