Harrogate Borough Council v Simpson

For statutory succession to a secure tenancy, the phrase “living together as husband and wife” requires a man and a woman living together in the same household. It does not include a homosexual relationship between two women. The fact that a relationship may involve affection, permanence, monogamy, domestic life or public recognition does not alter the statutory meaning. Whether an unmarried couple falls within the family provisions may be assessed by ordinary popular understanding, but that approach cannot convert a same-sex relationship into the statutory relationship.

The appeal concerned possession of a council dwelling occupied by the appellant after the death of the tenant, Mrs Maureen Rodrigo. The appellant and the deceased had lived together in a lesbian relationship for more than two years. The facts were undisputed.

The Harrogate County Court held that the appellant was neither the deceased’s spouse nor a member of her family for the purposes of sections 30 and 50(3) of the Housing Act 1980, and ordered possession, rent and mesne profits, and costs. The central issue on appeal was whether the statutory expression “living together as husband and wife” included their relationship.

Lord Justice Watkins delivered the leading judgment. Mr Justice Ewbank agreed that the appeal should be dismissed and independently stated that the essential characteristic of living together as husband and wife was that there should be a man and a woman living together in the same household.

1. Statutory scheme. Under sections 30(1) and 30(2) of the Housing Act 1980, succession to a secure periodic tenancy requires occupation as the only or principal home and qualification as either the tenant’s spouse or another qualifying family member. Section 50(3) includes specified relatives and persons who live together as husband and wife.
2. Meaning of the statutory phrase. The expression was not apt to include a homosexual relationship between two women. Similarities such as mutual affection, permanence, monogamy, a shared household or public acknowledgement could not satisfy the statutory requirement. In Watkins LJ’s view, an ordinary man or woman would not regard such a union as akin to living as husband and wife.
3. Authorities and legislative context. The court treated the ordinary-man approach discussed in Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox 1976, Q.B. 503 as relevant to the assessment of popular understanding. That case concerned an unmarried opposite-sex partnership and did not require the court to treat a same-sex relationship as matrimonial. The court also rejected the submission that changes in social attitudes or provisions in other legislation justified extending the statutory words. If Parliament had intended that result, it would have stated it expressly.

The appellant therefore did not qualify as the deceased’s spouse or family member and could not succeed to the tenancy. The appeal was dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused, and a 21-day stay was granted.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On appeal from the Harrogate County Court decision of Mr Assistant Recorder Zermansky dated 20 July 1984, the court dismissed the appeal, upheld the possession order and monetary orders, awarded costs, refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords, and granted a 21-day stay.