Anderton v Ryan

Under section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, a mistaken belief cannot by itself convert objectively innocent conduct into a criminal attempt. The accused must perform a criminal act which is more than merely preparatory.

Factual impossibility does not prevent liability where such a criminal act is accompanied by the requisite general or specific criminal intent. However, a person who completes an innocent transaction by handling goods which are not stolen commits no attempt to handle stolen goods merely because the person believes them to be stolen.

The appellant bought a video recorder and told the police that she believed it was stolen. The prosecution withdrew a charge of handling stolen goods under section 22 of the Theft Act 1968. The justices proceeded on the basis that the recorder had not been stolen and dismissed a charge of attempted handling under section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.

The Divisional Court, reported at [1985] 2 W.L.R. 23, allowed the prosecutor's appeal and directed the justices to convict. The central issue before the House was whether an objectively innocent purchase became attempted handling solely because the purchaser mistakenly believed the goods to be stolen.

1. Appeal allowed by a majority of four to one. Lord Roskill and Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the principal speeches. Lord Fraser of Tullybelton and Lord Keith of Kinkel agreed with both. The Divisional Court's order was set aside, save as to costs, and the justices' dismissal of the attempt charge was restored.

2. Per Lord Roskill and Lord Bridge, sections 1(1) and 1(4) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 replaced the former common law offence of attempt. Sections 1(2) and 1(3) were complementary. Section 1(2) removed factual impossibility as a defence where there was a guilty act and a general criminal intent, as where a pickpocket put a hand into an empty pocket. Section 1(3) addressed criminal action undertaken with a specific intent which the accused mistakenly believed capable of fulfilment.

3. Per Lord Bridge, section 1 did not create liability where a person embarked upon and completed a course of conduct which was objectively innocent, solely because that person believed facts which would have made the conduct criminal. Lord Roskill agreed that neither completion of such innocent conduct nor failure after more than merely preparatory innocent acts constituted an attempt. Clearer and more drastic language would have been required to criminalise guilt residing in the mind alone.

4. Applying that construction, the recorder had to be treated as never having been stolen. The appellant's purchase was therefore an objectively lawful transaction, notwithstanding her belief. She was not liable for attempting dishonestly to handle stolen goods. The certified question was revised and answered accordingly. The cause was remitted to the Queen's Bench Division, and the parties' House of Lords costs were ordered to be paid from central funds.

5. Lord Edmund-Davies dissented. He considered that sections 1(2) and 1(3) required the facts to be taken as the appellant believed them to be. On that basis, her purchase and receipt were more than merely preparatory acts directed towards handling stolen goods, and he would have dismissed the appeal.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the appeal by four votes to one. It set aside the Divisional Court's order, save as to costs, revised and answered the certified question in the appellant's favour, and remitted the cause to the Queen's Bench Division.
2. Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division: The court, reported at [1985] 2 W.L.R. 23, allowed the prosecutor's appeal and directed the justices to convict the appellant of attempted handling.
3. Justices for Greater Manchester: Dismissed the charge of attempted handling because the prosecution had not established that the video recorder was stolen.