R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex p Bakhtaur Singh (Ex p Bakhtaur Singh)

When deciding whether to deport a person, the Secretary of State and the immigration appellate authorities must consider every matter relevant to the statutory discretion. Relevant matters may include the adverse effect of deportation on third parties, ranging from business partners or a local community to the public as a whole.

The reference to compassionate circumstances in paragraph 154 of the applicable immigration rules does not confine paragraphs 156 and 158 to the personal circumstances of the proposed deportee and close associates. General public law principles independently require consideration of all relevant matters. Relevance depends on the facts of the individual case, while the weight given to a relevant third-party interest remains for the decision-maker.

The appellant entered the United Kingdom for a limited period under the Immigration Act 1971 but remained after his leave expired. He became highly valued by the Sikh community for his religious, charitable and cultural services. After the Secretary of State decided to deport him as an overstayer, an adjudicator dismissed his appeal and the Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused leave to appeal.

Hodgson J granted judicial review, quashed the refusal of leave and remitted the matter to the tribunal. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision in [1984] Imm AR 217, holding that the relevant compassionate circumstances were confined to matters personal to the appellant and those closely connected with him.

The central issue was whether the adverse effect of deportation on the Sikh community was nevertheless a relevant factor or circumstance under paragraphs 156 and 158 of the applicable immigration rules and under general public law.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading speech. Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, Lord Brightman, Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Goff of Chieveley agreed with his reasons and proposed order.

2. Per Lord Bridge, paragraph 154 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules described the usual balance between the public interest in enforcing immigration control and personal circumstances militating against deportation. It was an introductory generalisation rather than an exhaustive restriction on the matters made relevant by paragraphs 156 and 158. Immigration rules made under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 were discursive guidance, expressed in broad and imprecise terms, rather than a precise statutory code.

3. Per Lord Bridge, the natural meaning of “every relevant factor” in paragraph 156 and “all the relevant circumstances” in paragraph 158 included relevant interests of third parties adversely affected by deportation. Such interests could extend from a business partner or employer to a local community and ultimately the public. The ambit of relevance was the same for convicted offenders and overstayers. The rules did not reserve consideration of such interests exclusively to the Secretary of State.

4. Per Lord Bridge, general public law principles independently required the Secretary of State to consider all matters relevant to the statutory discretion. A decision made without considering a known and genuinely relevant third-party interest would be open to judicial review. For an overstayer, it would also be appealable under section 19(1) of the Immigration Act 1971 as a decision not in accordance with law.

5. Per Lord Bridge, relevance must be determined in the circumstances of each case. Political repercussions or threats of industrial action may be irrelevant and therefore impermissible considerations. The value of the appellant’s services to the Sikh community was not political in that sense and should not have been disregarded. The weight to be given to that interest remained for the tribunal, and might be reduced because the reputation and services were developed while the appellant was unlawfully present.

6. The adjudicator had therefore misdirected himself. The House set aside the Court of Appeal’s order, restored Hodgson J’s order and required the tribunal to reconsider the whole matter de novo, determining weight for itself. The tribunal was ordered to pay the appellant’s costs in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

1. House of Lords: Allowed the appellant’s appeal unanimously, set aside the Court of Appeal’s order and restored Hodgson J’s order.

2. Court of Appeal: Stephenson, Fox and Purchas LJJ allowed the tribunal’s appeal in [1984] Imm AR 217, reversed Hodgson J and dismissed the application for judicial review.

3. High Court: Hodgson J granted judicial review, quashed the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s refusal of leave to appeal and remitted the matter to the tribunal for reconsideration.

4. Immigration Appeal Tribunal: Refused the appellant leave to appeal from the adjudicator’s decision.

5. Immigration adjudicator: Dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to deport the appellant.