Ogwo v Taylor

A person who negligently starts a fire may owe a duty of care to a professional firefighter who is injured while properly fighting it. The duty extends to foreseeable ordinary risks inherent in the particular fire. It is not confined to exceptional or additional hazards.

Remoteness depends on whether the kind of damage was reasonably foreseeable. The precise mechanism and severity of the injury need not have been foreseen. Liability also requires an unbroken causal connection between the negligence and the injury. A firefighter's training and equipment inform that assessment but create no categorical exclusion from recovery. The American “fireman's rule” has no place in English law.

The defendant negligently set fire to the roof of his terraced house while using a blow lamp. The plaintiff, an acting leading fireman, entered the roof space in protective clothing and breathing apparatus. While properly attempting to extinguish the fire, he suffered serious burns caused by scalding steam penetrating his clothing.

Nolan J dismissed the claim because the injuries were not reasonably foreseeable. The Court of Appeal, reported at [1987] 2 W.L.R. 988, reversed that decision and awarded the agreed sum of £14,402. The defendant appealed to the House of Lords. Negligence was admitted, volenti was not relied upon, and the appeal concerned duty, foreseeability, remoteness and causation.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading speech. Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Elwyn-Jones, Lord Templeman and Lord Ackner agreed with his reasons. The Court of Appeal's order was affirmed, and the defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff's costs.

2. Per Lord Bridge, the trial judge had asked the wrong question about remoteness. The question was whether the damage differed in kind from what was reasonably foreseeable, not whether the plaintiff or defendant foresaw the precise nature or severity of the burns. Applying Hughes v Lord Advocate [1963] AC 837, the risk of scalding injury was one of the real risks inherent in entering the burning roof space and directing water onto the fire. It was neither far-fetched nor avoidable by the firefighter through the proper performance of his duty.

3. Per Lord Bridge, the plaintiff fell within the established neighbour principle. A person negligently starting a roof fire should contemplate that firefighters will attend, use their skills to do what is reasonably necessary and practicable, and encounter the risks inherent in those operations. The defendant therefore owed the plaintiff a duty of care. The causal chain from the negligent ignition of the fire to the burns was continuous and unbroken.

4. Per Lord Bridge, no principle limits liability to injuries caused by an exceptional or additional feature of a fire. Subject to proof of causation, a professional firefighter acting with proper skill and efficiency may recover for injury caused by an ordinary risk arising from the particular fire. Training, equipment and professional skill remain relevant to whether injury was foreseeable and whether the firefighter acted properly. They do not place the firefighter at a disadvantage compared with a lay rescuer.

5. Per Lord Bridge, recovery is not automatic whenever a firefighter is injured at a negligently caused fire. The claimant must prove the causal connection. That connection may be broken by foolhardy exposure to an unnecessary risk, whether undertaken voluntarily or pursuant to a superior officer's order. No such conduct occurred here.

6. Per Lord Bridge, adopting and endorsing the approach in Salmon v Seafarer Restaurants Ltd [1983] 1 W.L.R. 1264, liability may arise where the negligently started fire foreseeably requires firefighters to attend and its nature exposes even properly skilled firefighters to injury. Some fires may require attendance without posing such a foreseeable risk. The American “fireman's rule”, which excludes a duty concerning the hazard that occasions the firefighter's engagement, has no place in English law.

1. House of Lords: The defendant's appeal was dismissed unanimously. The order of the Court of Appeal was affirmed, with costs to the plaintiff.

2. Court of Appeal: Dillon, Stephen Brown and Neill LJJ reversed Nolan J and entered judgment for the plaintiff in the agreed sum of £14,402: [1987] 2 W.L.R. 988.

3. High Court: Nolan J found that the defendant had negligently started the fire but dismissed the claim because the plaintiff's injuries were not a reasonably foreseeable consequence.