Buckinghamshire County Council v Moran

For limitation-based adverse possession, the claimant must establish factual possession, the intention to possess, and adverse possession for the statutory period. Where the paper owner has not discontinued possession, dispossession must be proved. Paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act 1980 prevents an implied licence arising merely because occupation is compatible with the owner's present or future plans. A future public or development purpose may inform the assessment of the squatter's intention, but creates no special rule modifying ordinary concepts of possession and dispossession. Complete enclosure, a locked gate and treatment of land as part of a garden established exclusive control and an intention to exclude the paper owner for the time being.

Buckinghamshire County Council held the paper title to a vacant plot acquired for a possible future road. The respondent and his predecessors had enclosed the plot, maintained it as part of the adjoining garden and used it exclusively. Hoffmann J dismissed the Council's possession claim, holding that the respondent had acquired title by adverse possession under sections 15 and 17 of the Limitation Act 1980. He also ruled that a letter marked without prejudice was inadmissible. The Council appealed on both issues. The central questions were whether the letter was a negotiating document and whether the respondent had dispossessed the Council for the statutory period.

1. Without prejudice letter. The judge correctly identified the question as whether the letter of 20 January 1976 was a negotiating document. The protection extends to documents forming part of negotiations, including an opening communication, but the letter must indicate a genuine willingness to negotiate. The letter asserted the respondent's rights and indicated that he might seek legal advice. It did not offer terms, propose compromise or clearly indicate willingness to negotiate. It was therefore admissible. This ground of appeal was well founded.
2. Adverse possession. Under the Limitation Act 1980, the claimant had to establish dispossession or discontinuance of possession, factual possession, the requisite animus possidendi, and adverse possession for twelve years. The Council had not discontinued possession, so the issue was dispossession. Possession required appropriate exclusive physical control and an intention, for the time being, to exclude the world at large, including the paper owner. An intention to own the land was unnecessary.
3. Future use and implied licence. Paragraph 8(4) of Schedule 1 abolished any assumption of implied permission merely because occupation was consistent with the owner's present or future enjoyment. There was no remaining special rule for land retained for a future public or development purpose. Such a purpose could make the court cautious and could affect the quality of the squatter's intention, especially where known to him, but the statutory words retained their ordinary meaning.
4. Application. By 28 October 1973 the respondent had secured complete physical control. The plot was enclosed, the gate was locked, and the land was incorporated into the adjoining garden and maintained accordingly. The lock and chain unequivocally demonstrated an intention to exclude the Council. His acknowledgment that he might leave if the bypass was built was consistent with an intention to possess for the time being and did not prevent adverse possession. The defence under sections 15 and 17 succeeded.
5. Slade LJ delivered the leading judgment. Nourse LJ agreed and added that the true owner's future intention was generally irrelevant, save that known plans might affect the squatter's intention. He considered Bramwell LJ's special-purpose dictum in Leigh v Jack no longer supportable. Butler-Sloss LJ agreed with both judgments. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Held that the letter was admissible but dismissed the Council's overall appeal because the substantive adverse-possession judgment was correct. Appeal dismissed with costs; leave to appeal refused.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Hoffmann J dismissed the Council's claim for possession and held that the respondent had acquired title by adverse possession. He ruled that the letter was inadmissible.