Hicks and others v Wright (sued as Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police)

Fear, however intense, is a normal human emotion and does not by itself constitute an injury for which damages may be awarded. Fear of impending death experienced before a fatal injury therefore creates no cause of action capable of surviving for the benefit of the deceased’s estate.

The House of Lords will interfere with concurrent findings of fact by the courts below only where both courts were clearly wrong. This restraint applies to concurrent inferences from undisputed primary facts. Damages for negligence are compensatory, not punitive.

Two young women died from traumatic asphyxia in the Hillsborough Stadium disaster. Their parents, acting as administrators of their estates, claimed damages under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934. They alleged that each woman had acquired a cause of action for injuries suffered while conscious before her death.

Hidden J found that the claimants had not proved any compensable injury before the fatal crushing. The Court of Appeal, comprising Parker, Stocker and Nolan LJJ, affirmed that finding. The estates appealed with leave.

The central issues were whether the House should disturb the concurrent factual findings and whether fear of impending death could itself support an award surviving for the benefit of an estate.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Bridge of Harwich delivered the leading speech. Lord Templeman, Lord Griffiths, Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed with his reasons. The Court of Appeal’s order was affirmed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent’s costs.

2. Per Lord Bridge, the House exercises special restraint where the courts below have made concurrent findings of fact. It will generally interfere only if both courts were clearly wrong. The principle applies to concurrent inferences of fact even where the primary facts are undisputed. It does not depend solely upon the trial judge’s advantage in seeing and hearing witnesses.

3. Per Lord Bridge, the finding that no compensable physical injury had been proved before the fatal crushing was fairly open to Hidden J and the Court of Appeal. The accepted medical evidence showed that crushing caused loss of consciousness within seconds and death within minutes. The evidence did not establish a preceding period of physical injury accompanied by conscious pain and suffering. The House could not say that the concurrent conclusion was wrong.

4. Per Lord Bridge, fear by itself, whatever its degree, is a normal human emotion for which damages cannot be awarded. A person who undergoes a terrifying event but escapes without injury has no claim merely for the distress experienced. Accordingly, fear of impending death before the fatal injury is inflicted does not create a cause of action surviving for the benefit of the estate.

5. Per Lord Bridge, the question whether damages for physical injury may be increased because of the terrifying circumstances in which it was inflicted did not arise on the facts and was left undecided. Any such question might involve difficult issues of causation.

6. Per Lord Bridge, damages in a civil action for negligence are compensatory rather than punitive. The relatives’ anger at the disaster, however understandable, could not affect the assessment of damages.

1. House of Lords: The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The Court of Appeal’s order was affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
2. Court of Appeal: Parker, Stocker and Nolan LJJ affirmed Hidden J’s finding that no compensable injury before death had been proved. The court granted leave to appeal.
3. High Court: Hidden J dismissed the claim after finding that the claimants had not proved that either deceased suffered an injury before death for which damages could be awarded.