Barclays Bank plc v O’Brien

[1993] QB 109

Case details

Case citations
[1993] QB 109 · [1992] EWCA Civ 11 · [1992] 3 WLR 593 · [1992] 4 All ER 983
Court
Court of Appeal
Judgment date
22 May 1992
Judgment text

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Subjects
Equity and trusts Undue influence Suretyship
Keywords
marital home third-party security material misrepresentation undue influence independent legal advice informed consent constructive notice creditor and surety equitable relief
Outcome
appeal allowed unanimously (3–0)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Where a creditor knows that a debtor’s relationship with a proposed surety creates a real likelihood of influence and reliance, equity may restrain enforcement of security over the surety’s property. Relief may arise where the debtor procured consent through undue influence or material misrepresentation, or where the surety lacked an adequate understanding of the transaction.

The creditor must take reasonable steps to secure the surety’s true and informed consent. Appropriate steps commonly include recommending independent advice or fairly explaining the nature and effect of the security. Formal agency between debtor and creditor is unnecessary. A creditor which leaves the transaction entirely to the debtor may therefore be affected by the debtor’s impropriety.

Factual background

A bank agreed to increase a company’s overdraft in return for a guarantee from the appellant’s husband, secured by a second charge over their jointly owned matrimonial home. The husband falsely represented that the charge was limited to £60,000 and would last only a few weeks. The appellant signed at a branch of the bank without reading the documents, receiving an explanation or being advised to obtain independent advice.

The Slough County Court held the unlimited charge enforceable because the husband had not acted as the bank’s agent. The wife appealed. The central issue was whether equity could restrain the bank from enforcing the security despite the absence of agency or knowledge of the husband’s misrepresentation.

Held

  1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed unanimously. The charge was unenforceable against the appellant beyond £60,000. Since the bank had already recovered that sum, the security was treated as satisfied against her. The bank was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and proceedings below.

  2. Protected sureties. Scott LJ, with whom Butler-Sloss LJ agreed, held that the established equitable protection of wives providing security over their property for their husbands’ debts remained good law. The principle also extended to analogous relationships in which influence by the debtor and reliance by the surety were natural and probable. Purchas LJ preferred to express the principle without fixed categories: it applied whenever the creditor knew or ought to have known that the relationship created a real risk that the surety would not contract freely and with full appreciation of the obligation.

  3. Conditions for relief. Equity may restrain enforcement where:

    1. the creditor knows of the relationship and consequent likelihood of influence and reliance;
    2. the debtor procures consent through undue influence or material misrepresentation, or the surety lacks an adequate understanding of the transaction; and
    3. the creditor fails to take reasonable steps to secure the surety’s true and informed consent.

  4. Agency unnecessary. The bank had not appointed the husband as its agent. Merely leaving a debtor to procure security does not ordinarily create agency. Formal agency was nevertheless unnecessary for equitable relief. The contrary analysis in Midland Bank plc v Perry was inconsistent with the earlier authorities and was not followed.

  5. Reasonable precautions. A clear written recommendation to obtain independent advice will commonly be advisable. Where signing occurs at the creditor’s premises, the creditor should fairly explain the security’s nature and effect. Giving such an explanation solely to obtain unimpeachable security does not, without more, amount to assuming a tortious duty of care.

  6. Application. The husband’s representation about the amount and duration of the charge was material and caused the appellant’s misunderstanding. His family pressure was insufficient to constitute undue influence because it did not overcome the appellant’s will. The bank nevertheless knew of the marital and business context and failed to carry out its own instructions to explain the documents and recommend independent advice. Enforcement beyond the represented limit was therefore inequitable.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal: Allowed the wife’s appeal. The charge was treated as satisfied against her because the bank had already recovered the enforceable limit of £60,000. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
  • Slough County Court: His Honour Judge Marder QC upheld the bank’s claim because the husband had not acted as its agent, although his material misrepresentation had induced the wife to execute the charge.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed unanimously (3–0)

Appeal to higher court

Appealed to
Outcome of appeal
appeal dismissed unanimously

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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