Bateman & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 creates a statutory right to compensation only where a conviction was reversed or a person was pardoned because a new or newly discovered fact showed beyond reasonable doubt that a miscarriage of justice had occurred. A reversal based on a legal ruling applied to facts known at the time does not satisfy that condition. An ex gratia policy creates no entitlement to payment. The Secretary of State’s assessment of serious public-authority default and exceptional circumstances is reviewable, at most, on the narrow basis that the conclusion was not open to him. The court cannot substitute its own view. Neither refusal of compensation was unlawful.

Two appeals challenged the refusal of judicial review by the Divisional Court on 5 May 1993. Katrina Howse’s convictions for trespass were quashed after the Greenham Common Byelaws were declared invalid by the House of Lords in Director of Public Prosecutions v Hutchinson [1990] 2 AC 783. Andrew Bateman’s convictions were quashed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) after evidence had been wrongly admitted.

Both appellants sought compensation under section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 and, alternatively, ex gratia payments under the Home Secretary’s 1985 policy. The central issues were whether the reversals resulted from new or newly discovered facts, whether serious default or exceptional circumstances existed, and whether the policy created a legitimate expectation of payment.

The appeals were dismissed unanimously. The Master of the Rolls gave the principal judgment, with Farquharson and Simon Brown LJJ agreeing. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused, with no order as to costs.

1. The natural reading of section 133(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies the new or newly discovered fact condition both to a conviction reversed and to a person pardoned. Section 133(5) expressly includes convictions quashed on an appeal out of time or on a reference under section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. Section 133 and Schedule 12 therefore do not support a construction imposing the condition only on pardons.

2. Neither appellant satisfied that condition. In Howse’s case, the invalidity of the byelaws resulted from a legal ruling that they were ultra vires. In Bateman’s case, the reversal resulted from a ruling that evidence had been wrongly admitted and from correction of an earlier judicial error. The relevant facts had been known throughout. Neither case involved a new or newly discovered fact.

3. The quashing of Bateman’s convictions preserved his position as if he had never been convicted. It did not itself establish the statutory precondition for compensation. The ordinary understanding that imprisonment was wrongful was insufficient where the statutory conditions were absent.

4. As to ex gratia compensation for serious default, the court did not decide whether that issue was justiciable. Assuming that review was available, the court could ask only whether the Secretary of State’s conclusion was obviously wrong or not open to him. It could not substitute its own assessment. It was open to conclude that neither case resulted from serious default by a police officer or another public authority.

5. The 1985 statement recognised that exceptional circumstances might justify payment but gave no assurance that compensation would be paid whenever the statutory criteria were not met. Whether a case was sufficiently exceptional was primarily for the Secretary of State. Neither case justified judicial interference with that assessment.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeals dismissed. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords refused.
2. Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division: On 5 May 1993, judicial review of the Home Secretary’s refusals was refused.