Clarke v Kato & Ors

For compulsory motor insurance purposes, a “road” is not confined to a conventional carriageway or to a place commonly called a road. Under the Road Traffic Act 1988, a privately owned car park, or part of it, may qualify where the public has lawful access and the area provides a definable route used for through traffic. Through traffic need not be vehicular: regular, unrestricted pedestrian use can suffice, with or without wheeled traffic. The relevant question is whether the car park is used for more than movement to parking spaces, so that its character includes that of a road. The route may be assessed with connected areas such as a ramp and passageway. Temporary obstruction by parked cars does not necessarily defeat the classification.

The plaintiff was injured by an uninsured car in a privately owned shoppers’ car park. The third defendant, substituted for the Motor Insurers Bureau, appealed a preliminary ruling by Assistant Recorder Goodchild in Great Grimsby County Court. The issue was whether the accident occurred on a road for the purposes of section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, so as to engage potential insurer liability under sections 151 and 145. The car park connected a public road to a pedestrian ramp and passageway and was used as a short cut by members of the public. The central question was whether the car park, alone or together with the connected route, was a road and whether pedestrian use could satisfy the statutory concept.

Potter LJ delivered the leading judgment. Waite LJ and McCowan LJ agreed. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

1. The definition of road in section 192 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 is not confined to highways or areas having the ordinary appearance or name of a road. The protective purpose of the legislation supports a broad construction covering routes on which members of the public may be encountered.
2. The approach in Oxford v Austin (1981) RTR 416 was helpful in directing attention to a definable route and public access. However, its formulation by reference to passage by vehicles was too narrow. A route used prima facie by pedestrians may fall within the statutory concept.
3. A car park, or part of one, may constitute a road where it is used for through traffic and not merely for movement to and from parking spaces. The relevant distinction is between a car park used only as such and one whose use includes a route between places beyond it.
4. Unrestricted pedestrian use of a definable route is sufficient, with or without wheeled traffic such as bicycles or prams. The route may comprise the accessible part of the car park together with the ramp and passageway. It need not occupy the whole car park or be marked in lanes.
5. The authorities, including Harrison v Hill (1932) JC 13, Bugge v Taylor (1941) 1 KB 198, Griffin v Squires (1958) 1 WLR 1106 and Land v Hindhaugh 1986 RTR 271, supported treating public pedestrian use as capable of establishing a road. The present route was regularly and incontrovertibly used as a pedestrian short cut, and the evidence showed a readily definable route from the ramp to the car park entrance. The trial judge’s concern about vehicular use was therefore unnecessary, and his conclusion was correct.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — Appeal by the third defendant dismissed with costs.
• Great Grimsby County Court — Assistant Recorder Goodchild decided the preliminary issue in favour of treating the accident location as a road.