R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex p. Ponnampalam Anandanadarajah

In an asylum claim, the applicant must place before the adjudicator the evidence and arguments relied on to show that internal relocation would be unreasonable. Where the only case advanced is that the proposed place of relocation is unsafe, and that case is rejected on the evidence, the adjudicator need not separately address other possible aspects of reasonableness that were not raised. The reasonableness inquiry under paragraph 343 of the Immigration Rules is distinct from the question whether return would expose the applicant to Convention persecution, but both must be considered on the material before the decision-maker. Refusal of leave to appeal discloses no error of law where the adjudicator has considered the relevant rules and rejected the only material ground relied on.

The applicant, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, claimed asylum after leaving Jaffna for Colombo and then travelling to the United Kingdom. The Special Adjudicator accepted that there was a well-founded fear of persecution in northern Sri Lanka but rejected the applicant’s evidence that Colombo was unsafe for him and found that the Sri Lankan authorities could protect him there.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, relying on an alleged failure to assess the reasonableness requirement in paragraph 343 of the Immigration Rules. The Tribunal refused leave, and Tuckey J refused permission for judicial review. The renewed application concerned whether those decisions involved an error of law.

1. Application refused. Hobhouse LJ gave the first judgment, with Peter Gibson LJ and Neill LJ agreeing. The court agreed with Tuckey J that there was no error of law in the refusal of leave to appeal. Legal aid taxation of the applicant’s costs was ordered.
2. Under paragraph 343 of the Immigration Rules, internal relocation may be relevant where there is a part of the country in which the applicant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and to which it would be reasonable to expect him to go. The inquiry must be assessed on the evidence and arguments advanced before the adjudicator.
3. The applicant’s only substantive case before the Special Adjudicator was that Colombo was unsafe and that he would face persecution there. The Adjudicator rejected that case, found that Colombo was safe for Tamils so far as Convention persecution was concerned, and concluded that the authorities were willing and able to protect the applicant. No separate personal, family or livelihood difficulty had been advanced as making relocation unreasonable.
4. On that evidential basis, the Adjudicator had the relevant rules and the overall nature of the inquiry in mind. His failure to refer expressly to other possible categories of reasonableness, which had not been raised, did not amount to an error of law. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal was entitled to refuse leave because the determination, read as a whole, disclosed no arguable legal error.
5. The approach was consistent with Imad Ali El-Tanoukhi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1993] Imm AR 71, and the related internal-relocation authorities concerning return to a safe part of the country.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for leave to move for judicial review refused; the court agreed with Tuckey J that there was no error of law.
• Divisional Court: Tuckey J refused permission on 13 February 1996.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: leave to appeal from the Special Adjudicator was refused on 2 January 1996.
• Special Adjudicator: upheld the refusal of asylum on 15 December 1995.