Dubai Bank Limited v Fouad Haji Abbas

For statutory domicile within a part of the United Kingdom, residence means that the place is a settled or usual place of abode. This requires some degree of permanence or continuity, assessed from all the circumstances.

Residence for three months does not lower the threshold for establishing residence. It merely raises a rebuttable presumption that the separate requirement of a substantial connection is satisfied.

A claimant seeking permission to serve proceedings outside the jurisdiction on the ground of domicile must establish a good arguable case on those requirements. Where highly material evidence placed before the courts below proves false, the appellate court may reconsider the jurisdictional issue afresh.

The Bank claimed money allegedly due on accounts held by Mr Abbas in Dubai. It obtained permission to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction, asserting that Mr Abbas was domiciled in England because a London flat was his home.

Potter J dismissed Mr Abbas's application under Order 12 Rule 8 of the Rules of the Supreme Court to set aside service. He found a good arguable case that Mr Abbas was domiciled within the jurisdiction. He separately set aside the claim based on a Dubai judgment because its validity and enforceability under English law had not been sufficiently established. That ruling was not challenged.

After the hearing below, a highly material assertion that Mr Abbas appeared on the Community Charge Register for the flat proved false. The central issue was whether, on a fresh assessment of the evidence, the Bank had shown a good arguable case that the flat was a settled or usual place of abode for Mr Abbas.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Saville LJ delivered the judgment, with which Aldous LJ and Simon Brown LJ agreed. The orders for substituted service and service outside the jurisdiction were discharged, as was the ancillary Mareva order against both defendants.

2. Although appeals concerning interlocutory jurisdictional decisions should be rare, the Court had to determine this matter afresh. Both the judge who granted permission without notice and Potter J had been given an apparently important assertion that Mr Abbas was registered for Community Charge at the London flat. The Bank had relied heavily on that assertion, but it was false.

3. Under section 41(3) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, residence in a particular part of the United Kingdom requires that the place be a settled or usual place of abode. This bears its ordinary English meaning and connotes some degree of permanence or continuity. The assessment is fact-sensitive. The duration of a person's presence may be important in some cases, while the nature of the move and the person's foreign connections may be decisive in others.

4. Section 41(6) does not suggest a low threshold for residence. It provides only that residence for the preceding three months raises a rebuttable presumption of the separate requirement of a substantial connection. It gives no guidance on whether residence has been established in the first place.

5. Once the false registration evidence was removed, the remaining evidence did not justify substantially discounting Mr Abbas's account. His involvement in acquiring and refurbishing the flat, his family's use of it and his occasional stays were substantially consistent with his explanation. The evidence also showed extensive business activity in Belgium, communications directed there, and repeated occasions when he was absent from the flat.

6. The Bank therefore failed to establish a good arguable case that the London flat was a settled place of abode or home for Mr Abbas when the writ was issued. Its asserted basis for domicile failed. The Bank was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and the outstanding costs below.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Allowed Mr Abbas's appeal unanimously. The orders for substituted service and service outside the jurisdiction, together with the ancillary Mareva order, were discharged.

2. Queen's Bench Division: Potter J dismissed Mr Abbas's application to set aside service insofar as the Bank relied on domicile under Order 11 Rule 1(1)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. He set aside the writ insofar as it claimed on the Dubai judgment under sub-rule (1)(m). The latter ruling was not appealed.

3. Queen's Bench Division: Rougier J had granted the Bank permission without notice to serve the proceedings outside the jurisdiction.