Brightwell v Secretary of State for the Environment; Broadland District Council

Planning inspectors must give intelligible reasons addressing the primary issues raised by the evidence and applicable policies. Their reasoning is read pragmatically and as a whole, without excessive scrutiny for minor defects. That approach does not excuse failure to address a material alternative, such as whether an agricultural enterprise requires accommodation nearby rather than on the site, or whether suitable accommodation exists in a settlement. Where viability is disputed, the inspector must explain why the evidence does not provide clear support for the enterprise. An inspector need not search for a time-limited permission where no such condition is raised, but a proposed time condition may require consideration where viability is central and the possibility is expressly identified.

Mr Brightwell applied under section 288 of the Town and Planning Act 1990 to quash an Inspector’s refusal of planning permission for a residential caravan at a piggery in Norfolk. The High Court, presided over by His Honour Judge Rich QC, dismissed the application. On appeal, the issues included the conditional grant of leave to amend and whether the Inspector had adequately addressed the functional need for accommodation, the enterprise’s viability, and a possible time-limited permission.

The central question was whether the decision letter disclosed proper consideration of the material issues and gave adequate reasons.

The Master of the Rolls delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justice Aldous and Lord Justice Brooke agreed with the order, with Lord Justice Aldous adding reasons on the merits.

1. Appeal allowed. The conditional requirement imposed by the High Court judge when granting leave to amend was unnecessary and inappropriate. An adjournment was not required because the proposed amendment raised no issue affecting Broadland District Council beyond the case already defended by the Secretary of State. The Master of the Rolls also expressed reservations about imposing such a requirement on a legally aided litigant, given the statutory safeguards applicable to wasted-costs orders.
2. The Inspector was under a statutory duty to give intelligible reasons addressing at least the primary issues. Applying the pragmatic approach stated in Bolton Metropolitan Borough Council v The Secretary of State (1990) 61 P & CR 343, the decision letter had to be read as a whole, while avoiding excessive astuteness in identifying defects.
3. The Inspector distinguished financial or viability considerations from functional considerations, but failed adequately to address the functional case. The material issue was not simply whether the applicant had to live on the site. It included whether the increased herd required him to live nearer than Norwich and, if so, whether suitable accommodation was available in a nearby settlement. The decision letter did not make clear whether the Inspector had overlooked that issue or had rejected the supporting evidence.
4. The viability conclusion was also inadequately reasoned. In light of evidence indicating a possible income margin, the Inspector had to explain why there was no clear evidence that the enterprise was likely to continue for a reasonable period.
5. A time condition was not generally something an Inspector had to investigate without an appropriate reference, as explained in Top Deck Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State [1991] JPL 961. Here, however, the possibility was expressly identified by the Local Planning Authority and was relevant to the viability concern. The Inspector’s failure to mention it was a further, though minor, defect.
6. The decision was quashed and remitted to the Secretary of State for reconsideration by an Inspector. The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and below.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the appeal, quashed the Inspector’s decision, and remitted the matter to the Secretary of State for reconsideration by an Inspector.
• Queen’s Bench Division: His Honour Judge Rich QC, sitting as a High Court judge, dismissed the application under section 288 of the Town and Planning Act 1990.