Routestone Limited v Minories Finance Limited & Anor

An appellate court should interfere with a judge’s discretionary decision on amendment of pleadings only where the decision was wrong in principle or plainly wrong, including through reliance on irrelevant matters or omission of relevant matters. A proposed amendment made halfway through a substantial trial may properly be refused where it introduces a new aspect of the case, requires an adjournment and further evidence, and would cause unfairness. The possibility that another judge might have exercised the discretion differently does not make the refusal reasonably arguable on appeal.

Routestone brought proceedings alleging negligence by mortgagees and their receivers in selling properties at an undervalue. On the fourth day of a seven-day trial, it sought leave to re-amend its pleading to allege that the purchase price paid in 1981 had been disclosed to a prospective purchaser. Jacob J refused the amendment, considering it substantially and unfairly late. A single Lord Justice refused leave to appeal. Routestone renewed its application before the Court of Appeal, challenging the judge’s understanding and assessment of the proposed allegation. The central issue was whether refusal of the amendment was wrong in principle or plainly wrong.

Lord Justice Mummery gave the first judgment, and Lord Justice Auld agreed. The application for leave to appeal was refused.

1. The Court of Appeal may interfere with the exercise of discretion on an amendment application only if the judge acted wrongly in principle or exercised the discretion plainly wrongly. This includes cases where irrelevant matters were taken into account or relevant matters were left out of account.
2. The appellate court must examine the arguments made on both sides and the reasons given by the judge. It is insufficient to show merely that another judge might have reached a different discretionary conclusion.
3. The proposed amendment was sought on the fourth day of a substantial trial and introduced a new aspect of the negligence case. Evidence had already been heard and substantial costs incurred. Allowing the amendment would inevitably have required an adjournment so that the defendants could investigate the allegation and obtain further evidence. The judge was entitled to regard the application as exceptionally late and unfair.
4. The defendants had advanced further objections, including the absence of supporting evidence in the form of a witness statement or notice under the Civil Evidence Act. The Court concentrated on the judge’s two principal reasons, which were legally sound and sufficient to defeat the application.
5. There was no reasonably arguable basis for concluding that Jacob J had exercised his discretion wrongly. Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The renewed application for leave to appeal was refused.
• High Court, Chancery Division: Jacob J refused leave to re-amend the Statement of Claim on the fourth day of the trial.