A, R (on the application of) v Westminster City Council

Section 21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948 is not a general safety net for anyone lacking money or accommodation. An applicant must need care and attention, by reason of age, illness, disability or other circumstances, where that care is not otherwise available.

The phrase any other circumstances is not automatically confined by ejusdem generis. Statutory purpose is the primary guide. For asylum seekers excluded from housing and social-security support, destitution, inability to speak the language, unfamiliarity with the country and the stress of seeking refuge may cumulatively create a qualifying need. Local authorities may act before health has deteriorated. Mere poverty or homelessness alone is insufficient.

These conjoined judicial review appeals concerned four asylum seekers whose applications remained pending. Under section 6 of the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993, they could not be removed or required to leave the United Kingdom while their claims were determined.

Because their asylum claims were not made at the point of entry, the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 and related instruments excluded them from public housing assistance and social-security benefits. Their terms of entry also prevented employment. Collins J, on 8 October 1996, quashed local-authority refusals to provide accommodation under section 21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948. The local authorities and the Secretary of State appealed, arguing that the provision addressed care needs rather than needs for money, food or accommodation. The central issue was whether destitution caused by exclusion from other welfare provision could place an asylum seeker within section 21(1)(a).

Lord Woolf MR delivered the judgment of the Court. The appeal was dismissed.

1. Statutory scheme. Section 21(1)(a) of the National Assistance Act 1948 is concerned with residential accommodation for adults who need care and attention, by reason of age, illness, disability or other circumstances, where that care is not otherwise available. It is not an automatic entitlement for anyone without money or accommodation. Accommodation is the means by which care and attention may be provided.
2. Construction. The statutory routes for financial need, homelessness and care may overlap. The withdrawal of housing and social-security benefits by the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 did not amend section 21. Section 21(8) therefore did not prevent assistance where the other relevant statutory routes had ceased to be available. The Court treated the Act’s statutory purpose as more important than any automatic application of ejusdem generis, relying on Rands v Oldroyd (1959 1 QB 209) and Quazi v Quazi 1980 AC 744.
3. Asylum seekers. Lack of food and accommodation, inability to speak the language, unfamiliarity with the country, the stress of claiming refugee status and the passage of time could cumulatively produce a qualifying need for care and attention. Eligibility remained a matter for the local authority. Authorities could anticipate deterioration and provide assistance before actual damage to health occurred.
4. Directions and outcome. The Secretary of State’s 1993 Directions could not alter the proper construction of section 21(1)(a), but were not ultra vires and provided useful guidance. Collins J’s general approach was correct, but his references to a residual safety-net obligation were too broad. The appeal was dismissed. Costs were divided equally between the Secretary of State and the relevant local authority in each case. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

1. Queen’s Bench Division (Crown Office List): Collins J, on 8 October 1996, quashed the local authorities’ refusals by orders of certiorari.
2. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On appeal with leave from Collins J, the court dismissed the appeal and refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.