Taylor v Ribby Hall Leisure Ltd

The court has an inherent discretionary power to strike out contempt proceedings and proceedings invoking supervisory jurisdiction over its officers as an abuse of process, even where no limitation period applies. The power protects the integrity of court orders, officers and processes. Its exercise requires consideration of all the circumstances, including delay, the reasons for it, prejudice, the public interest and the realistic prospects of coercive or compensatory relief. Such proceedings should generally be brought within a reasonable time after the alleged breach or misconduct becomes known. Although delay is usually better addressed at the substantive hearing, preliminary strike-out is permissible where prolonged inexcusable delay creates genuine prejudice and there is no real prospect of relief.

The Taylors brought a motion against Christopher Young, a solicitor acting for the defendant companies, seeking committal and compensation for alleged contempt, aiding and abetting breaches of court orders and breach of his personal undertaking to the court.

Mr Justice Collins struck out the motion on 6 June 1996 as an abuse of process. He found inordinate and inexcusable delay, serious prejudice to Mr Young and no real prospect that compensation would be recoverable. The appeal concerned whether contempt and supervisory proceedings could be struck out despite the absence of a limitation period, and whether the discretion had been properly exercised.

1. Appeal dismissed. Lord Justice Mummery delivered the judgment of the court. The court upheld the order striking out the motion as an abuse of process.
2. The court possesses an inherent discretionary power to strike out both contempt proceedings and proceedings invoking its supervisory jurisdiction over its own officers. The absence of a limitation period does not prevent that power. A right to initiate proceedings at any time remains subject to the court’s overriding power to protect the integrity of its processes.
3. The criminal abuse-of-process jurisdiction provides a relevant analogy. The question is whether, considering the circumstances in the round, delay has made it unfair to continue holding the defendant to account. The court must consider the length and reasons for the delay, prejudice and fairness, the special nature of the jurisdiction, the public interest, and the prospects of granting the relief sought.
4. The supervisory jurisdiction over solicitors is a summary disciplinary jurisdiction. It may extend to compensation for loss caused by misconduct, without requiring an enforceable civil-law right: Re HA Grey [1992] 2 QB 440. Compensation is available only where the conduct is inexcusable and merits reproof, applying the principles summarised in Udall v Capri Lighting Ltd [1988] 1 QB 907 at 917 D. The jurisdiction is flexible and unfettered by absolute rules: Myers v Elman [1948] AC 282 at 318.
5. The judge had considered the delay, its explanations, the special jurisdiction, the public interest and the risk of prejudice. The delay was long and unjustified, and there was a genuine risk of prejudice to Mr Young. Since there was no real prospect of committal or compensation, allowing the motion to proceed would itself be an abuse of process.
6. As guidance, submissions on delay, prejudice and potential injustice will generally be better addressed at the substantive hearing than on a preliminary strike-out application. Proceedings of this kind should ordinarily be initiated within a reasonable time after knowledge of the breach or misconduct. The order for costs and legal-aid taxation was confirmed, pursuant to section 18 of the Legal Aid Act.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the order striking out the motion.
• Queen’s Bench Division, Preston District Registry: Mr Justice Collins struck out Mrs Taylor’s motion on 6 June 1996 as an abuse of process.