Camelot Group Plc v Centaur Communications Ltd

This judgment applies section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 as a rule requiring necessity before a court may compel disclosure of a journalist's source.

Protection of journalistic sources is a matter of high public importance and will not be overridden except by necessity arising from another high public interest.

An employer's interest in identifying a disloyal employee who has obtained confidential documents may, on the facts, amount to such necessity.

The respondent (the licence-holder of the National Lottery) obtained an order requiring the publisher to disclose material that would assist identification of the source who had leaked draft accounts. The publisher appealed against the order under section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, citing Article 10 ECHR and the House of Lords decision in [1991] 1 A.C. 1 (X Ltd v Morgan Grampian) and the European Court judgment in (1996) 22 EHRR 123 (Goodwin v United Kingdom).

The central question was whether disclosure was "necessary" in the interests of justice so as to outweigh the public interest in protecting journalistic sources.

1. Outcome: Appeal dismissed. The Court of Appeal (Schiemann, Thorpe and Mummery LJJ) upheld the judge's order requiring disclosure/return of documents to enable identification of the source.
2. The court applied section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 as reflecting Article 10 ECHR. Protection of sources is of high public importance and is to be overridden only where necessity is shown for another public interest listed in s.10.
3. The court adopted the balancing approach illustrated in [1991] 1 A.C. 1 and the Strasbourg authority in (1996) 22 EHRR 123. The two authorities deploy substantially the same legal principles though they may come to different factual conclusions.
4. An employer's legitimate interest in identifying a disloyal employee or collaborator is a relevant factor and can, in some cases, amount to the required necessity under s.10. The court rejected the submission that such an interest can never suffice.
5. The necessity inquiry is fact-sensitive. The court must weigh (a) the importance of source protection; (b) the nature and public value of the information; (c) the manner in which the information was obtained (legitimately or illegally); and (d) the particular public interest relied on (for example, preventing future disclosures or terminating a disloyal employee).
6. On the facts the court found no significant public interest in the premature publication. There remained a continuing and substantial risk of harm from an insider who had demonstrated untrustworthiness. That risk, together with the employer's need to identify the culprit to restore workplace confidence and prevent future disclosures, satisfied the necessity test.
7. Practical result: the judge's order was upheld; the stay was refused; leave to appeal to a further court was refused. Costs follow the event.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — appeal from the Queen's Bench Division (Langley J). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and refused stay and leave to appeal.
• Queen's Bench Division — initial ex parte and inter partes applications heard by Langley J; the judge granted the order returning documents and stayed part of delivery up; his refined order formed the basis of the appeal to the Court of Appeal.