Daniels v Griffiths

An action may be struck out for abuse of process or an improper collateral purpose, and exceptionally where it is conclusively shown to be bound to fail. Because the power is drastic, it must be exercised with the greatest care, and a genuine factual issue that cannot be resolved on affidavit should proceed. Absolute witness immunity attaching to court proceedings does not extend automatically to communications to a Parole Board. The Board is not a court, and its statutory constitution does not justify Crown-like immunity. Such communications may attract qualified privilege, but not absolute privilege on that basis. Communications to police may be immune where they form part of investigating a possible offence or preparing evidence, but uncertainty about their context prevents strike-out on public-policy grounds.

The claimant, serving a life sentence after pleading guilty to rape, alleged that the defendant had defamed him in communications to police concerning their relationship, his alleged fixation and the risk he posed if released. He said the publications damaged his reputation and affected his parole prospects. A Deputy District Judge struck out the writ and statement of claim under Order 18, rule 19. Tucker J upheld that order, finding abuse of process, an improper collateral purpose, harassment and hopelessness. On appeal, the issues were whether those grounds justified strike-out and whether public policy immunised communications to the police or Parole Board. The Court of Appeal also considered whether the issues could be resolved on affidavit evidence.

1. Disposition. Sir Brian Neill delivered the judgment of the court. Swinton Thomas LJ and Hirst LJ agreed. The appeal was allowed.
2. Strike-out and abuse of process. The court accepted that proceedings may be struck out under the rules or inherent jurisdiction where they are conducted abusively, brought for an improper or collateral purpose, or, exceptionally, shown conclusively to be bound to fail. The power must be exercised with the greatest care. The principles stated in Lonrho Plc v Fayed (No.5) [1993] 1 WLR 1489 and Lonrho Plc v Fayed (No.2) [1992] 1 WLR 1 did not justify striking out this claim. Although the claim faced formidable difficulties, a factual issue remained for trial and could not be resolved on affidavit. The action had also been issued before the Parole Board’s decision, so it could not have been brought to challenge that decision.
3. Communications to the Parole Board. The court rejected the proposed extension of absolute witness immunity to communications made to the Parole Board. The Board’s statutory constitution under the Criminal Justice Act 1991, including section 32 and Schedule 5 paragraph 1(1), showed that it was not a court of law and did not enjoy Crown immunity. Communications to the Board might attract qualified privilege, but the court would not make that privilege absolute.
4. Communications to police. The immunity recognised in Taylor v The Director of the Serious Fraud Office CA Transcript 97 - 1327 and Watson v McEwan [1905] AC 480 may cover statements and preparatory discussions forming part of an investigation into a possible offence or the preparation of evidence. The evidence did not establish whether all the relevant communications concerned possible criminal conduct or whether some were made in response to parole-related enquiries. Since the documentary evidence was incomplete, it would be wrong to reach a final conclusion on immunity or strike out the claim on public-policy grounds.
5. The form of the statement of claim would require careful reconsideration if the action proceeded. The amended statement of claim was to be served within 21 days. The appeal was allowed with costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 27 November 1997, allowed the appeal with costs and directed service of an amended statement of claim within 21 days.
2. High Court, Queen’s Bench Division: Tucker J upheld the order striking out the writ and statement of claim. Leave to appeal was subsequently granted by Brooke LJ.
3. Deputy District Judge: On 15 February 1995, struck out the writ and statement of claim.