London Borough Of Camden v Akanni

After a possession warrant has been executed, the court retains a narrow inherent jurisdiction to intervene where the underlying order is set aside, the warrant was obtained by fraud, or its execution involved abuse of process, oppression or vexation. The jurisdiction prevents injustice and its categories are not closed, but it is exercised sparingly. Clear notice that eviction will proceed unless the entire rent debt is paid is inconsistent with oppression. Acceptance of a part-payment, issuing a replacement rent book, and advice about housing benefit did not, on these facts, represent that execution would be postponed.

Mr Akanni was a secure tenant of premises let by the local authority. After substantial rent arrears accrued, the Central London County Court made a suspended possession order requiring payment of the arrears by instalments alongside the current rent. The payments were not maintained.

The authority warned that eviction would proceed unless the entire debt was cleared. Mr Akanni made a substantial part-payment, received a temporary rent book, and was advised to continue a housing-benefit application. The warrant was nevertheless executed. The County Court refused to set it aside. Mr Akanni sought leave to appeal, arguing that the authority’s communications and conduct amounted to oppression and had deprived him of an opportunity to seek relief before execution.

1. Disposition. Sir Brian Neill gave the first judgment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave to appeal. Lord Justice Brooke agreed.
2. The court recognised the restricted post-execution jurisdiction identified in Leicester City Council v Aldwinckle (1991) 24 H.L.R. 40 and London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham v Hill (1994) 27 H.L.R. 368. After execution, a warrant may be suspended or set aside where the underlying order is set aside, the warrant was obtained by fraud, or its execution involved abuse of process or oppression.
3. The alleged representations did not amount to oppression. The written warning made clear that eviction would proceed unless the entire debt was cleared. It was not oppressive to accept £400 when £600 had been promised, rather than reject the payment. The replacement rent book and advice to continue a housing-benefit application did not reasonably imply that the warrant was safe or that eviction had been cancelled. There was therefore no arguable case for exercising the inherent jurisdiction.
4. The court noted that, before execution, section 85 of the Housing Act 1985 provided the context for an application to stay or suspend execution or postpone possession. After execution, the available jurisdiction was materially narrower.
5. Lord Justice Brooke added observations on the inherent jurisdiction. It exists to prevent the court’s process being abused to produce injustice, should be exercised very cautiously, and is not confined to a closed category. He referred to Cocker v Tempest (1840-1841) 7 M&W 501, AB and Others v John Wyeth and Brothers Limited (unreported 13 December 1996), Metropolitan Bank Ltd v Pooley (1885) 10 App. Cas. 210, and McHenry v Lewis [1882] 22 Ch. 397. Those observations did not alter the conclusion. The order was application dismissed, with no order as to costs save legal aid taxation of the applicant’s costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed Mr Akanni’s application for leave to appeal and declined to interfere with execution of the possession warrant.
• Central London County Court: refused the application to set aside the executed warrant of possession.