Bhatt v Chelsea & Westminster Healthcare NHS Trust

Applications to extend time for an appeal require consideration of the length of delay, its reasons, the prospects of success and prejudice, together with all other relevant circumstances. Courts should generally enforce procedural time limits because delay burdens other litigants and the administration of justice, and satellite litigation is undesirable. The absence of respondent prejudice and a reasonably arguable appeal may favour an extension, but they do not automatically overcome serious, inadequately explained delay. Where the underlying issue can still be argued at trial, and a later appeal remains available, refusing an extension may be just despite the appeal’s merits.

Dr Bhatt brought libel proceedings against Chelsea and Westminster Healthcare NHS Trust concerning press releases about the closure of a medical unit. The Trust pleaded qualified privilege. A master refused to strike out that plea, and the High Court judge dismissed Dr Bhatt’s appeal and granted leave to appeal.

The order was sealed on 8 January 1998. Dr Bhatt applied on 15 May 1998 for an extension of time to serve a notice of appeal. The central issue was whether the delay and its explanation justified exercising the court’s discretion to extend time.

Lord Justice Peter Gibson, giving the judgment of the court, refused the application and ordered Dr Bhatt to pay the costs.

1. Rules of the Supreme Court O.59,r.4(1) required service of a notice of appeal within four weeks after the judgment or order was sealed or perfected. O.59,r.15(1) gave the court below power to extend time where the application was made within that period. O.3,r.5 gave the court a general power to extend a time limit on just terms.
2. The usual considerations were the length of the delay, the reasons for it, the prospects of the appeal succeeding, and prejudice to the respondent. Those factors were not exhaustive. The court had to consider all relevant circumstances: C.M. Van stillevoldt B.V. v E.L. Carriers Inc [1983] 1 WLR 207; Finnegan v Parkside Health Authority [1998] 1 WLR 411.
3. Procedural time limits were rules to be observed, not merely targets. The court should consider the effect of delay on other litigants and on the administration of justice, and should discourage satellite litigation: Mortgage Corporation v Sandoes (Times Law Reports, December 27th, 1996) and Arbuthnot Latham Bank Ltd and Others v Trafalgar Holdings Ltd [1998] 2 All ER 181.
4. The delay was serious and inadequately explained. The merits of the proposed appeal favoured the applicant, and the respondent could identify no prejudice directly caused by the delay. Those matters did not outweigh the importance of enforcing time limits. The qualified-privilege issue could still be argued at trial, with a further appeal available if necessary. The application was therefore refused with costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) refused the application for an extension of time to serve a notice of appeal and ordered costs against the applicant.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division dismissed Dr Bhatt’s appeal from the master’s refusal to strike out the qualified-privilege plea and granted leave to appeal.
• Master Trench refused to strike out the qualified-privilege plea in the defence.