Ali v Westminster City Council (Nairne v Camden London Borough Council)

A County Court has no inherent power to grant an injunction. Its jurisdiction must come from statute. Under section 38 of the County Courts Act 1984, read with section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the relevant question is whether an injunction is “just and convenient”. That power remains confined to cases involving an enforceable legal or equitable right, or unconscionable conduct.

Under the Housing Act 1996, accommodation duties may end when the authority’s decision is notified and be replaced by a discretion during review or appeal. The applicant then has no substantive accommodation right supporting an injunction. The discretion may be challenged by judicial review, while the statutory appeal is limited to points of law.

These conjoined appeals arose from decisions of the Central London County Court. In Ali, Judge Previte granted an interlocutory mandatory injunction requiring Westminster City Council to provide accommodation. In Nairne, Judge Cowell made a similar order against Camden London Borough Council.

Each applicant had completed the review process under section 202 of the Housing Act 1996 and was pursuing an appeal under section 204. The central issue was whether the County Court had jurisdiction to compel accommodation by interim injunction pending determination of that appeal.

1. Disposition. Lord Justice Otton delivered the leading judgment. Lord Justice Mummery and the President agreed. The appeals were unanimously allowed and the injunctions were lifted.
2. The statutory scheme distinguishes between accommodation duties and discretionary accommodation. Duties under sections 188, 190 and 200 of the Housing Act 1996 may require interim accommodation during the inquiry or decision-making stages. Sections 188(3) and 200(5) provide that relevant duties cease when the decision is notified, even if a review is requested. The authority may continue accommodation thereafter, but only in the exercise of discretion. Section 204(4) likewise permits, but does not require, accommodation during the appeal period.
3. The County Court is a statutory court and has no inherent jurisdiction to grant injunctions. Any such jurisdiction had to arise under section 38 of the County Courts Act 1984, by reference to the High Court’s power under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The statutory phrase “just and convenient” is not unfettered. The principles identified in South Carolina Insurance Co v Assurantie Maatschappij “De Zeven Provincien” NV [1987] AC 24 require an enforceable legal or equitable right, or unconscionable conduct.
4. The local authority’s decision whether to continue accommodation during review or appeal was not unconscionable per se. Once the statutory duty had ended, the applicants possessed no substantive right to accommodation and only a statutory right of appeal. An interim injunction could not be ancillary to a right that did not exist. The County Court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant the orders.
5. A challenge to the authority’s exercise of discretion under sections 202 or 204 could be brought by judicial review, in accordance with R v Camden LBC ex p Mohammed 30 HLR 315 and the usual principles referred to in Pulhofer v Hillingdon LBC [1986] 1 AC 484. The section 204 appeal remained an appeal on a point of law only. The final order provided for the injunctions to be lifted, a section 18 costs order not to be enforced without leave, taxation of the parties’ costs, and refusal of leave to appeal to the House of Lords.

• Court of Appeal: Heard conjoined appeals from the Central London County Court, allowed the appeals and lifted the interlocutory mandatory injunctions. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
• Central London County Court: Judge Previte in Ali and Judge Cowell in Nairne granted injunctions requiring the local authorities to provide accommodation pending the section 204 appeals under the Housing Act 1996.