Weth v Attorney-General

On a statutory appeal against a decision of a quasi-judicial decision-maker, the decision-maker is not ordinarily a proper respondent where no relief is sought against it and the governing statute provides for another respondent, such as the Attorney General. The court must decide joinder by reference to the circumstances of the individual appeal. Allegations of bias or misconduct do not, by themselves, justify joinder. General discovery is not an appropriate reason for joinder, although the court has an inherent power to order production of specific documents necessary to determine the appeal. A decision-maker may also be liable for costs where the applicable principle permits it, without being joined.

John Weth and James Muggleton appealed to the High Court against orders made by the Charity Commissioners under sections 18(1)(vii) and 18(2)(i) of the Charities Act 1993. The orders appointed a receiver and manager and removed the trustees. The appeals included allegations of bias and misconduct by the Commissioners, who were not initially joined.

A deputy judge ordered that the Commissioners be joined as defendants and directed pleadings and general discovery. The Commissioners appealed. The central issue was whether they were proper defendants under Order 108, rule 5(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

1. Appeals allowed. The deputy judge’s orders joining the Charity Commissioners as defendants were discharged. The Commissioners were not proper defendants to the statutory appeals.
2. The appeals under section 92 of the Charities Act 1993 were not by way of case stated. In light of Jones v Attorney General [1974] Ch 148, factual findings underlying the Commissioners’ decisions could be challenged, so the appeals could fairly be treated, for present purposes, as rehearings.
3. The governing question was whether the Commissioners were proper defendants under Order 108, rule 5(2), rather than whether their presence was strictly necessary under Order 15, rule 6(2)(b)(i). The latter consideration could be relevant by analogy, but was not the only consideration.
4. The court started from the position that joinder was generally neither necessary nor desirable. The statute made no provision for the Commissioners to be necessary respondents, expressly provided for the Attorney General as a respondent, and reflected the special relationship between the Attorney General and the Commissioners in charity matters.
5. Allegations of bias or misconduct did not themselves make the Commissioners proper defendants. They could be put to the Commissioners’ officers in cross-examination without joinder. General discovery was inappropriate, but the court had an inherent power to order production of particular documents necessary to determine the appeal, on a properly evidenced application.
6. The possibility of obtaining costs against the Commissioners did not justify joinder. If appropriate, a costs order could be made under the Aiden Shipping Co Ltd v Interbulk Ltd principle. Lord Justice Nourse also stated that any findings unsupported by the Attorney General should be identified by the judge hearing the appeal, even if the Attorney General supported the decision itself.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed the Commissioners’ appeals and discharged the deputy judge’s orders joining them as defendants.
• High Court, Chancery Division: On 29 July 1998, the deputy judge allowed the plaintiffs’ appeals from the Master, ordered joinder of the Commissioners, and directed pleadings and general discovery.
• Master, Chancery Division: On 21 May 1998, Master Dyson declined joinder and disclosure, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay the Attorney General’s and Commissioners’ costs.