Morford & Ors v Rigby & Anor

Criticism of a product does not ordinarily amount to libel of its distributor or retailer. The publication must convey an imputation of culpable responsibility, such as incompetence, negligence or recklessness. Whether words are capable of bearing a defamatory meaning is determined by reading the publication as a whole, in its context and having regard to its mode of publication. A reasonable reader is neither naïve nor unduly suspicious and should not select a defamatory meaning where a non-defamatory meaning is available. An imbalance between a damaging allegation and a subsequent answer does not require consideration of the “bane and antidote” principle unless the publication as a whole is capable of injuring the claimant’s reputation.

The appellants, two individuals and two companies involved in distributing, marketing and promoting N-Viro soil fertiliser, brought a libel action concerning an article reporting environmental campaigners’ fears that the fertiliser might contain dangerous chemicals and cement-kiln dust. The article also reported contrary assurances about the product’s safety.

Bell J, on an application under RSC Ord. 82 r. 3A, held that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meaning and dismissed the action. The appellants appealed, relying on an amended meaning alleging that they knew, ought to have known, or suspected that the fertiliser might be dangerous. The central issue was whether the article was capable of conveying that meaning.

1. Appeal dismissed. The order dismissing the libel action was upheld, with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
2. Per Lord Justice Otton, criticism or disparagement of a claimant’s goods is not by itself defamatory of the claimant. A libel requires an inference of culpable responsibility in the claimant’s conduct of business, such as inefficiency, negligence, recklessness or more serious wrongdoing.
3. The court must consider the words complained of as a whole, in their context and having regard to the mode of publication. Isolated passages cannot be selected where other parts of the publication throw a different light on them.
4. The article was sensational and substantially unbalanced, but it reported a dispute and used cautious language concerning the alleged dangers. It identified the developer and producer of the fertiliser. Even readers who knew that the appellants promoted or marketed the product would not necessarily infer culpable irresponsibility from their distribution of a product which might be unsafe.
5. There was no basis for inferring that the appellants knew, ought to have known, or suspected that the fertiliser was harmful. The article was therefore incapable of bearing the amended defamatory meaning, and no properly directed jury could find it defamatory.
6. The “bane and antidote” principle did not arise. It applies only where the publication as a whole is capable of injuring the claimant’s character. Since this article was not so capable, the court did not need to decide whether the later contrary material neutralised the earlier allegations.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld Bell J’s order dismissing the action, with costs. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.
• Queen’s Bench Division: Bell J, on an application under RSC Ord. 82 r. 3A, held that the words were incapable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meaning and dismissed the action.