Richardson v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council

Under the Education Act 1996, a local education authority is not required to name a school in every statement of special educational needs. The authority must specify the type of school or other provision considered appropriate, but naming a particular school depends on its judgment, having regard to suitability, parental wishes, efficient education and the avoidance of unreasonable expenditure.

A Special Educational Needs Tribunal has power to order amendment of a statement by naming a school, subject to section 326(4), but no general duty to do so. It must exercise its own judgment and may name no school, amend the description of provision, or adjourn to enable further consideration. A tribunal must not require an unnecessarily expensive residential placement where the child does not need the additional provision.

Three appeals concerned statements of special educational needs under the Education Act 1996. Mrs Richardson and Mrs White appealed against High Court decisions dismissing challenges to Special Educational Needs Tribunal decisions which had not named their preferred schools. The common issue was whether an authority or tribunal had to name a school whenever special educational provision was required.

In the Lane appeal, the Tribunal replaced the authority’s maintained-school placement with a non-maintained residential school, although it had found that the child did not need a twenty-four-hour curriculum. The authority appealed from the decision of Collins J. The White appeal also raised whether the Tribunal had acted unfairly by relying on specialist expertise without inviting submissions.

1. Richardson and White: appeals dismissed. The wording of section 324(4)(b) required an authority to name a school only where it considered both that the school was appropriate and that it should be specified. The statutory scheme therefore conferred a judgment or discretion, rather than an absolute duty, to name a school. Section 312(4) defined special educational provision broadly enough to include naming a school, but did not make naming inevitable. Provision could also be made otherwise than at a school under section 319.
2. The Tribunal likewise had power, but no general obligation, to order amendment of a statement by naming a school under section 326(3)(b). Section 326(4) restricted that power where the school had not been preferred or proposed. It would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to impose on the Tribunal a duty which Parliament had not imposed on the authority.
3. Where the authority’s proposed school was rejected, the Tribunal was not required automatically to name the parent’s preferred school, even if it could meet the child’s needs. It could amend the description of provision, adjourn to allow the authority to identify another suitable placement, or name no school, while the statutory requirements concerning efficient use of resources and avoidance of unreasonable expenditure remained relevant.
4. In White, specialist Tribunal members could draw on their educational expertise. It would generally be preferable to tell the parties when an unconsidered school or alternative provision was being contemplated and invite submissions. However, the Court found no established procedural unfairness causing a substantial wrong or miscarriage, and remission would not serve the children’s interests.
5. Lane: appeal allowed and remitted to a different Tribunal. The Tribunal had found that the child did not need a twenty-four-hour curriculum but nevertheless ordered the authority to name a residential school providing one. That approach overlooked the duty to use resources efficiently. The Tribunal and Collins J. had erred in law.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Richardson and White appealed from decisions of Dyson J. dated 8 July 1997; Hereford & Worcester appealed from the decision of Collins J. dated 4 September 1997.
• Special Educational Needs Tribunal: determined the children’s special educational provision and school placements under the Education Act 1996.
• High Court: Dyson J. dismissed the Richardson and White appeals. Collins J. dismissed the Hereford & Worcester appeal.
• Court of Appeal: dismissed the Richardson and White appeals, and allowed the Hereford & Worcester appeal, remitting it to a different Tribunal.