J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Kingswood Borough Council

[1998] EWCA Civ 643

Case details

Case citations
[1998] EWCA Civ 643
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
6 April 1998
Judgment text

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Subjects
Land valuation Compulsory acquisition Planning obligations
Keywords
Point Gourde principle no-scheme world ransom value development value compulsory purchase Lands Tribunal planning permission section 52 agreement remission
Outcome
appeal allowed in part; award remitted to the lands tribunal
Judicial consideration

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Summary

When valuing land subject to a deemed compulsory acquisition, the Point Gourde principle excludes only an increase in value entirely attributable to the scheme underlying the acquisition. The relevant scheme is a question of fact for the specialist tribunal. The tribunal must identify the scheme and its consequences, construct the appropriate no-scheme world, and disregard only value generated by that scheme. Value arising from other factors, including development potential or ransom value, remains relevant. An appellate court should not interfere with factual valuation conclusions merely because another conclusion was possible. A remission is appropriate where the tribunal may have misunderstood the effect of a contractual restriction material to its valuation.

Factual background

Kingswood Borough Council agreed to transfer a strip of former railway land to Avon County Council for highway purposes, with the price to be determined by the Lands Tribunal. The land was required to complete a link road serving a wider development by J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd. Pye argued that the land had only nominal value because any ransom value arose from the highway scheme and had to be disregarded under the Point Gourde principle.

The Lands Tribunal valued the land at £756,500. It treated the ransom value as arising principally from Pye’s contractual and planning obligations to complete the link road. Pye appealed, challenging the identification of the scheme and the valuation methodology. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had erred in law or fact, and whether it had properly construed the restriction affecting residential development.

Held

  1. Disposition. The appeal was allowed in part. The Lands Tribunal’s award was remitted for reconsideration of the limited effect of clause 15 of the 1979 agreement. The main challenge to the valuation approach failed.
  2. Point Gourde principle. Under Point Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v Sub-Intendant of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565, compensation must exclude an increase in value entirely due to the scheme underlying the acquisition. The tribunal must first identify the scheme and its consequences, then value the land in the resulting no-scheme world, following the approach explained in Wards Construction (Medway) Ltd v Barclays Bank Plc [1994] 68 P&CR 391.
  3. Question of fact. Following Wilson v Liverpool Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 302 and Batchelor v Kent County Council [1989] 59 P&CR 357, identifying the scheme and deciding whether an enhancement was entirely attributable to it were matters for the Lands Tribunal as fact-finding specialist. The Tribunal was not required to adopt the wider link-road scheme urged by Pye. Its conclusion that the relevant scheme was completion of the link road was open to it and was not perverse.
  4. Ransom value. The Tribunal was entitled to find that the premium value arose from Pye’s obligations and the development value unlocked by acquiring the strip, rather than entirely from the authorities’ highway scheme. The value therefore fell outside the exclusion required by Point Gourde and had to be reflected in the valuation.
  5. Construction and remission. Clause 15 restricted only residential development under the existing planning permissions. Fresh planning permission could therefore have enabled residential development without first securing release from clause 15. The Tribunal had not explained whether it had considered that distinction or whether it affected the estimated delay and ransom value. The award was accordingly remitted on that limited issue, without further evidence. The appellant was ordered to pay two-thirds of the respondent’s costs, with one-third of both parties’ costs to be costs in the remission.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  • Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal from the Lands Tribunal was allowed in part. The principal valuation reasoning was upheld, but the award was remitted for reconsideration of clause 15 of the 1979 agreement.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed in part; award remitted to the lands tribunal

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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