Henderson v Temple Pier Co Ltd

For limitation purposes, a personal injury claimant who gives solicitors general responsibility for conducting a claim may be fixed with knowledge of facts which they ought reasonably to have acquired on the claimant’s behalf. The protection for facts ascertainable only through appropriate expert advice does not extend the limitation period where ordinary enquiries would have revealed the defendant’s identity.

Legal advice falls within that protection, if at all, only when expertise is needed to ascertain a fact. It does not protect a claimant from a solicitor’s delay or failure to obtain readily available factual information.

The claimant allegedly suffered personal injuries after slipping on a gangway leading to a vessel. She instructed solicitors shortly afterwards, but proceedings against the vessel’s owner and occupier began more than four years after the accident. Her solicitors had failed to identify the defendant promptly because their enquiries used an incorrect spelling of the vessel’s name.

His Honour Judge Simpson dismissed the defendant’s limitation application. He held that the claimant was not fixed with the deficiencies of her solicitors and therefore lacked constructive knowledge of the defendant’s identity.

The defendant appealed. The central issue was whether section 14(3) of the Limitation Act 1980 fixed the claimant with constructive knowledge which her solicitors ought to have acquired.

1. Appeal allowed unanimously. Mrs Justice Bracewell delivered the judgment, with which Lord Justice Beldam agreed. The claimant was fixed with constructive knowledge of the defendant’s identity. The county court’s order was set aside and a declaration substituted that the claim was statute barred under section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980.

2. Section 14 distinguishes knowledge of relevant facts from advice about whether those facts establish negligence, nuisance or breach of duty. Legal advice about the consequences of an act or omission is irrelevant to the statutory date of knowledge. A solicitor could fall within the expert-advice provision, if at all, only when giving assistance necessary to ascertain a fact.

3. Expert assistance may sometimes be needed to identify the defendant in the legal sense of determining whether responsibility rests with an occupier, employer, contractor or individual. Once the person occupying the relevant legal relationship has been identified, discovering that person’s name will ordinarily be a matter of factual enquiry. Only the most exceptional circumstances would make the name ascertainable solely through expert advice.

4. The claimant had entrusted her solicitors with general responsibility for conducting the claim. Their actions and acquired knowledge were therefore undertaken on her behalf. The ownership and occupation of the vessel and gangway were facts which she might reasonably have been expected to acquire through the enquiries made on her behalf.

5. The information was readily ascertainable without legal expertise. A site visit would have corrected the vessel’s name, and an enquiry to the Department of Transport produced ownership details within a week once the correct name was used. Section 14(3)’s proviso was not intended to extend limitation where a solicitor acted dilatorily in obtaining information available through ordinary enquiry.

1. Court of Appeal: The defendant’s appeal was allowed unanimously. The county court’s order was set aside and a declaration substituted that the claim was statute barred under section 11 of the Limitation Act 1980.

2. Mayor’s and City of London County Court: His Honour Judge Simpson dismissed the defendant’s limitation and abuse-of-process applications, ordered the defendant to pay the claimant’s costs and granted permission to appeal.