Hancocks, Re

Under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, an adult child is not required in every case to establish a moral obligation or other special circumstance before obtaining reasonable financial provision. The court must evaluate all relevant statutory factors, including needs, resources, the size of the net estate and other relevant matters. The assessment is made on the facts known at the date of the hearing. A subsequent increase or reduction in the estate may therefore affect both whether reasonable provision was made and, if not, the appropriate order. Delay may be relevant, particularly where it causes prejudice or results from unacceptable conduct, but it does not prevent consideration of later changes in circumstances.

The respondent, an adult daughter of the deceased, applied under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 for reasonable financial provision from her father’s estate. The Central London County Court held that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision and awarded maintenance of £3,000 a year.

After the deceased’s death, the value of land forming part of the estate increased substantially following its sale. The appellants, the respondent’s siblings and beneficiaries, argued that the claim should fail because there was no moral obligation to provide for her, and because the claim would have failed when first issued. The central issues were whether an adult daughter had to show a moral obligation or special circumstance, and whether the estate’s later increase in value could be considered.

The appeal was dismissed. The order for maintenance was upheld.

1. Adult child. The statutory scheme does not make a moral obligation or other special circumstance an essential condition of a successful application by an adult child. Re Coventry was not authority for that proposition. An adult applicant with an earning capacity may often need some special circumstance, typically a moral obligation, but that is an application of the statutory factors to particular facts rather than an inflexible legal rule. The respondent’s age, retirement, stringent circumstances, limited prospects and the substantially increased estate enabled the judge to find a failure to make reasonable provision.
2. Statutory factors. The court must have regard to all the specified matters in section 3, together with any relevant matter under section 3(1)(g). The test involves a value judgment and balancing exercise. The deceased’s recognition of family members and goodwill towards the respondent could properly be considered under section 3(1)(g), although the weight given to those matters was for the judge.
3. Date of assessment. Section 3(5) requires the court to take account of facts known at the date of the hearing. The current size and nature of the net estate therefore had to be considered at that date, not merely at the deceased’s death. This applied to the first question whether reasonable financial provision had been made as well as to the later question of the appropriate order.
4. Delay. Delay may be relevant under section 3(1)(g), particularly where it causes prejudice, reflects culpable conduct or involves manipulation of the estate. There was no such culpability or prejudice here. The trial judge had applied the relevant criteria and reached a balanced conclusion. No error of principle or misapplication of the facts was shown.

Butler-Sloss LJ gave the leading judgment. Judge LJ agreed. Knox J agreed and added that no particular factor is legally indispensable; the relevant question is whether the statutory balancing exercise justifies the conclusion reached.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Central London County Court.
• Central London County Court: held that the will failed to make reasonable financial provision for the respondent and awarded maintenance of £3,000 a year.