Chief Adjudication Officer v Maguire

Under section 16(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act 1978, repeal preserves a specific entitlement which existed at the date of repeal, even if it was inchoate or contingent. A mere hope, expectation or abstract ability to take advantage of legislation is insufficient.

A person who satisfied the substantive statutory conditions for special hardship allowance acquired a protected right before its repeal. Making a timely claim was a step required to enforce that right, rather than an event necessary to create it. The right could therefore be claimed after repeal, subject to compliance with the applicable time limit.

The respondent suffered from vibration white finger, which became a prescribed industrial disease on 1 April 1985. He was subsequently assessed as having an 8% disablement from that date for life. Special hardship allowance under section 60 of the Social Security Act 1975 was repealed on 1 October 1986, before he made his claim.

A Social Security Commissioner allowed the respondent's appeal and found that he had continuous good cause for his delayed claim. The Secretary of State and Chief Adjudication Officer appealed. The central issue was whether satisfaction of the substantive conditions before repeal gave the respondent a right acquired or accrued within section 16(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act 1978, although the claim was made after repeal.

1. Disposition. The appeal was dismissed unanimously. The respondent had acquired a right to special hardship allowance before section 60 of the Social Security Act 1975 was repealed. That right was preserved by section 16(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act 1978. The appellants were ordered to pay the costs, and leave to appeal was refused.

2. Simon Brown LJ held that the governing question was whether a right existed at the date of repeal. A mere hope or expectation, or an abstract ability shared by members of the public to take advantage of legislation, was insufficient. An entitlement to money or another certain benefit was sufficient, although it remained inchoate or contingent and required later notices, claims or proof.

3. The respondent acquired the relevant right when the disease from which he suffered became prescribed and the substantive qualifying conditions were met. A post-repeal claim made within the prescribed or properly extended time could enforce that existing right. Neither the absence of a pre-repeal claim nor the need to establish the extent of entitlement prevented section 16(1)(c) from applying.

4. Free Lanka Insurance Co Ltd v Ranasinghe [1964] AC 541 did not establish that a pre-repeal assertion or notice was invariably necessary. The notice in that case asserted a statutory right which already existed. Roberts v Potts [1894] 1 QB 213 was distinguishable because repeal there removed an optional method of recovery which had not been invoked.

5. Waller LJ agreed, while considering that an acquired right might be distinguished from an accrued and fully enforceable right. Clarke LJ likewise held that any such distinction did not affect the result. On the proper construction of sections 57 and 60 of the Social Security Act 1975, the substantive criteria created the right; the later claim enforced it. Replacement of section 79 by section 165A did not alter that conclusion.

1. Court of Appeal: Dismissed unanimously the appeal by the Chief Adjudication Officer and Secretary of State. The respondent's pre-repeal right to special hardship allowance survived under section 16(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act 1978.
2. Social Security Commissioner: Allowed the respondent's appeal, found continuous good cause for the delayed claim and regarded the argument that repeal barred a later claim for the pre-repeal period as untenable.