Aziz v Bethnal Green City Challenge Company Ltd

Time limits for appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal may be extended only in rare and exceptional cases where a reason justifies departure from the prescribed period. The discretion must be exercised judicially and applicants must provide a full, honest and acceptable explanation for delay.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal may adopt a stricter approach than the Court of Appeal because it is the final court on employment facts, hears appeals only on points of law, and has statutory power to regulate its procedure. The length of delay, merits and prejudice remain relevant, but merits and absence of prejudice usually carry little weight. Where an appeal plainly has no prospect of success, that may justify refusing an extension.

The applicant alleged racial discrimination arising from four unsuccessful applications for employment. The Employment Tribunal dismissed his claim and issued extended reasons dated March 1998.

The notice of appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal was received three days outside the 42-day period. The delay resulted from uncertainty about a handwritten date on the tribunal’s decision. The Registrar refused an extension, and Morison J, President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, dismissed the appeal after an oral hearing.

The applicant sought permission to appeal, arguing that the Employment Appeal Tribunal had applied an unjustifiably stricter approach than the Court of Appeal to extensions of time.

1. Application refused. The President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal was entitled to refuse an extension of time, although the explanation for the delay was full and honest. It was not an acceptable excuse because the date could have been clarified from the date stamp on the first page of the decision.
2. The discretion to extend time is judicial and must be exercised according to reason and justice. For appeals to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the prescribed time limit should be relaxed only in rare and exceptional cases where a reason justifies departure from the Rules. The applicant has no entitlement or legitimate expectation of an extension.
3. The Court of Appeal’s approach need not be replicated. It may, in an appropriate case, review factual findings where the lower court was plainly wrong. The Employment Appeal Tribunal is the final court on employment facts and hears appeals on points of law. Its statutory power under Employment Tribunals Act 1996, section 30(3), provides a proper basis for a stricter procedural approach.
4. The merits of a proposed appeal may be relevant, but they should not ordinarily be investigated in detail on an extension application. The proposed grounds disclosed no clear error of law. Absence of prejudice to the successful party is also a factor of little or no significance in this appellate context.
5. Sir Christopher Staunton added that, where it is plain that an appeal has no prospect of success, that is a relevant consideration because there is no point extending time for an appeal bound to fail.

The application for permission to appeal was refused with costs, excluding the costs of the hearing before Ward LJ on 25 March.

• Employment Tribunal: The applicant’s racial discrimination claim was dismissed after a hearing extending over October 1997 and March 1998.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: The Registrar refused an extension of time. Morison J, President, dismissed the appeal on 3 December 1998.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Permission to appeal was refused with costs, except for the hearing before Ward LJ on 25 March.