Ali v Courtaulds Textiles Ltd

For limitation purposes, knowledge that an injury is attributable to an act or omission requires more than a reasonable belief or suspicion where the causal question depends on expert medical evidence. A claimant is not fixed with constructive knowledge under section 14(3) while the fact remains ascertainable only through expert advice and the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to obtain and act on that advice. The inquiry is fact-sensitive and must take account of the claimant’s circumstances, including relevant personal characteristics and conduct. Seeking legal advice or recognising that a condition may have an occupational cause does not necessarily establish knowledge of the required causal fact.

The claimant had worked for the defendant in cotton mills for many years and later developed deafness. He alleged that the deafness was noise-induced and resulted from inadequate protection at work. The defendant succeeded on a limitation defence before the Oldham County Court, which held that the claim was outside the primary limitation period under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980.

The claimant appealed. The principal issue was whether, before receiving medical confirmation, he knew that his deafness was attributable to workplace noise, or was to be treated as having that knowledge constructively under section 14(3).

1. Appeal allowed. The proceedings were brought within the primary limitation period calculated under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980. The court therefore did not need to determine the alternative discretion under section 33.
2. Under section 14(1)(b), the relevant knowledge was knowledge that the claimant’s deafness was attributable to the alleged failure to protect him from workplace noise. It was not enough that he knew that noise could cause deafness, or that he reasonably believed or suspected a connection.
3. The distinction between knowledge, belief and suspicion is fact-sensitive. Where the medical cause of an injury is beyond the scope of an informed layperson, the claimant cannot know that particular cause until appropriate expert advice confirms it. The court should consider the claimant’s personal circumstances and infer his state of mind from the available evidence and his conduct.
4. Section 14(3) extends knowledge to facts which the claimant might reasonably have been expected to acquire. Its proviso prevents constructive knowledge from arising while the fact is ascertainable only through expert advice, provided the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to obtain and, where appropriate, act on that advice. The claimant had acted promptly after being alerted to the possibility of noise-induced deafness and had not been responsible for the delay in obtaining specialist advice.
5. The recorder had treated the claimant’s approach to solicitors as sufficient knowledge but had failed to apply the proviso. That conclusion was inconsistent with the statutory scheme and with Nash v Eli Lilley & Co [1993] 4 AER 395 and the relevant principle identified in Spargo v North Essex District Health Authority [1997] PIQR, 235.

Mr Justice Holman agreed. The appeal was allowed, with costs of and occasioned by the limitation issue payable forthwith if the claimant succeeded in his damages claim. Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal allowed. The court held that the claim was within the primary limitation period under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980.
• Oldham County Court: the Assistant Recorder held that the claim was out of time and that it was not equitable to permit it to proceed under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.