Parker v Chief Constable of the Hampshire Constabulary

Under section 24(6) of the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a constable must suspect both that an arrestable offence has been committed and that the person arrested is guilty. Each suspicion must have reasonable grounds. Suspicion is conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking, so an arrest of an innocent person may still be lawful. The test is objective, judged at the time of arrest by reference to the information in the arresting officer’s mind. Officers may rely on information supplied by colleagues, including information later shown to be wrong, but the arresting officer must personally possess sufficient information to provide reasonable grounds. Applying that test, the continuing link between the vehicle and one of the known suspects, together with the possibility that the other suspect remained connected with it, made the arrest lawful.

Graham Parker claimed damages against the Chief Constable after armed officers arrested him on suspicion of involvement in a firearms offence committed in Liverpool. The arrest followed the police tracing a white Vauxhall Astra linked to the two suspected offenders, Stephen Allen and Justin Muat. The arresting officer later accepted that Parker was not Allen and that he could only say that Parker might be Muat.

Mr Recorder Bullen, sitting at Portsmouth County Court, held on 21 May 1998 that the arrest was unlawful. The Chief Constable appealed. The central issue was whether, at the time of arrest, the officer had reasonable grounds for suspecting that Parker was guilty of the arrestable offence.

1. The appeal was allowed with costs. The arrest was lawful, although Parker was an innocent person arrested as a result of a genuine mistake.
2. Section 24(6) of the Police & Criminal Evidence Act 1984 requires the constable to suspect both that an arrestable offence has been committed and that the person arrested is guilty. The suspicion must be genuine and supported by reasonable grounds. Suspicion is distinct from guilt or prima facie proof.
3. The objective question is whether a reasonable person would have regarded the information in the arresting officer’s mind as providing reasonable grounds at the time the power was exercised. The relevant information is the officer’s own account of what he knew. It may come from other officers, anonymously, or from information later proved wrong.
4. The court applied the principles stated in Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey [1988] NLJR 180, Hussien v Chong Fook Kam [1970] AC 942 and O'Hara v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1997] AC 287. Officers involved in a team operation may rely on one another, but the arresting constable remains individually responsible and must have sufficient information before arresting.
5. By the time of arrest, the Astra remained directly linked to Allen and Muat. Although the officer no longer believed Allen was present, the information suggested that Allen and Muat might still be together or that Muat remained connected with the vehicle. The officer’s belief that Parker might be Muat was uncertain but reasonably grounded. Operational questions concerning re-authorisation did not alter the grounds for suspicion.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): allowed the Chief Constable’s appeal with costs and held that the arrest was lawful.
• Portsmouth County Court: Mr Recorder Bullen held on 21 May 1998 that the arrest was unlawful.