Tarlochan Singh v Secretary of State for the Home Department

[1999] EWCA Civ 1773

Case details

Case citations
[1999] EWCA Civ 1773
Court
Court of Appeal (Civil Division)
Judgment date
5 July 1999
Judgment text

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Subjects
Immigration Asylum and refugee law Appellate review of factual findings
Keywords
asylum well-founded fear of persecution subjective fear country evidence credibility findings Immigration Appeal Tribunal expert evidence remittal
Outcome
appeal allowed unanimously; remitted to the immigration appeal tribunal with costs to be assessed
Judicial consideration

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Summary

An appellate tribunal may review factual findings by a special adjudicator, but should be slow to interfere with credibility findings based on oral evidence. It should reverse such a finding only where it is unsustainable. This caution has less force where the issue is objective and assessed mainly from written country material.

Whether an asylum applicant subjectively fears return is distinct from whether that fear is well-founded. The first issue turns principally on the applicant’s accepted evidence and state of mind. Objective country evidence bears mainly on the second. A tribunal reassessing well-foundedness must address the applicant’s particular circumstances and explain clearly how it has approached the evidence. An inadequately reasoned conclusion cannot safely be upheld.

Factual background

Mr Singh, an Indian asylum applicant, appealed with permission against the Immigration Appeal Tribunal’s decision of 22 May 1998. The Tribunal had allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal from a special adjudicator, who had allowed Mr Singh’s appeal against the refusal and certification of his asylum claim.

The special adjudicator accepted important parts of Mr Singh’s account, including repeated detention and beatings, found that he feared return for a Convention reason, and considered that the fear was well-founded. The Tribunal criticised the credibility findings, rejected reliance on evidence concerning Dr Rai, and allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal. The central issues were the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to review those findings and whether it had sufficiently addressed Mr Singh’s individual risk on return.

Held

Disposition. The appeal was allowed unanimously, with costs, and the matter was remitted to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for reconsideration.

  1. Appellate review. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had jurisdiction to review factual findings by a special adjudicator. Under the guidance in Borissov v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] Imm AR 524 at 535, it should nevertheless be very reluctant to interfere with a primary finding dependent on the credibility or reliability of a witness heard by the adjudicator. It should reverse a finding where, in the final analysis, it is unsustainable. The Tribunal was wrong to describe the adjudicator’s credibility conclusion as perverse and to criticise his reliance on his assessment of Mr Singh as a witness.
  2. Separate asylum questions. The inquiry required separate consideration of the applicant’s credibility and factual history, subjective fear of return, Convention reason, and whether the fear was objectively well-founded. The Tribunal wrongly treated objective country material as bearing substantially on whether Mr Singh actually feared return. That issue principally concerned his accepted evidence and present state of mind.
  3. Expert and country evidence. The Tribunal was entitled to review the material and form its own view on well-foundedness. However, in asylum appeals, country evidence is commonly provided through written expert reports. The absence of viva voce evidence or cross-examination was not, by itself, a sufficient reason to reject Dr Rai’s evidence. The Tribunal also treated determinations concerning internal flight as undermining Dr Rai’s evidence, although those determinations did not contain criticism of the kind required to undermine the favourable assessment made in Charanjit Singh.
  4. Reasons and remittal. The Tribunal had not sufficiently formulated the issue or explained how the evidence bore on Mr Singh’s particular position in Punjab. Its conclusion might not necessarily have been wrong, and the Tribunal was not barred from exercising its jurisdiction. But the reasoning was insufficiently clear for the Court of Appeal safely to uphold the decision. The appeal was therefore remitted for reconsideration in light of the judgments.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

  1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — allowed the appeal with costs and remitted the appeal from the special adjudicator to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for reconsideration.
  2. Immigration Appeal Tribunal — on 22 May 1998 allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal from the special adjudicator.
  3. Special adjudicator — on 15 January 1997 allowed Mr Singh’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s asylum refusal and certification.

Lower court decision

Judgment appealed:
Not stated in the judgment
Outcome:
appeal allowed unanimously; remitted to the immigration appeal tribunal with costs to be assessed

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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