Gwynedd Council v Grunshaw

A statutory time limit for appealing to a county court cannot be extended where the enabling statute confers no such power, and filing by fax is ineffective where the procedural rules provide only delivery to the proper officer or post. A court officer cannot decide administratively that an appeal was issued in the wrong county court. The officer must accept and record a document presented in time, leaving venue to be determined judicially and, if necessary, corrected by transfer. Proceedings begun in the wrong county court remain valid for limitation purposes. An officer’s refusal to accept the document is an irregularity which does not nullify the proceedings.

Gwynedd Council made a demolition order under the Housing Act 1985 concerning the appellant’s house in Gwynedd. The appellant presented a notice of appeal at Skegness County Court within the statutory period, but the court manager refused to accept it, considering Caernarfon County Court to be the proper venue. She later faxed the notice to Caernarfon, where it was issued out of time.

The Caernarfon County Court initially dismissed the Council’s strike-out application. His Honour Judge Elystan Morgan allowed the Council’s appeal and struck out the appellant’s appeal. The central issues before the Court of Appeal were whether faxing constituted filing, whether the time limit could be extended, and whether the Skegness court manager was entitled to refuse the notice on venue grounds.

1. Appeal allowed. The order of His Honour Judge Elystan Morgan dated 3 November 1998 was set aside, so that the appellant’s appeal against the demolition order could be heard on its merits.
2. Under section 269(1) of the Housing Act 1985, the appeal had to be brought within 21 days of service. Neither the local authority nor the county court had power to extend that statutory period in the absence of statutory authority. The Court did not need to decide whether the period expired on Saturday 8 August or Monday 10 August 1998.
3. Faxing the notice to Caernarfon County Court on 8 August was ineffective. The County Court Rules 1981 provided for filing by delivery to the proper officer or by prepaid post, but made no provision for filing by fax.
4. The prescribed form under the Housing (Prescribed Forms) (No.2) Regulations 1990 directed an appellant to apply to the local county court. The possible conflict between that specific direction and the general venue rule in Order 4 rule 9 of the County Court Rules 1981 was a question for judicial determination, not administrative decision.
5. Under Orders 2 rule 4 and 1 rule 3, the court manager’s function was formal and administrative: to receive the document and enter it in the court records. He had no power to determine judicially which court was the proper venue. The question could be addressed under Order 16 rule 2 concerning proceedings commenced in the wrong court.
6. The authorities Faulkner v Love [1977] 1 QB 937 and Sharma v Knight [1986] 1 WLR 757 established that proceedings begun in the wrong county court could nevertheless be valid within the statutory period. The refusal to accept the notice was a failure to comply with the filing rules and an irregularity under Order 37 rule 5(1), not a nullity. The appellant had done everything required when she attempted to hand the notice to the proper officer on 7 August 1998.

• Court of Appeal: Allowed the appellant’s appeal and restored the ability to pursue the substantive appeal against the demolition order.
• Caernarfon County Court: His Honour Judge Elystan Morgan allowed Gwynedd Council’s appeal from the Deputy District Judge and struck out the appellant’s notice of appeal.
• Caernarfon County Court: The Deputy District Judge had dismissed the Council’s application to strike out the notice and directed the substantive appeal to proceed.