Sniezek v Bundy (Letchworth) Ltd

For limitation purposes, knowledge is assessed factually by reference to what the claimant knew and what knowledge he might reasonably have acquired. A firm belief that a significant injury is attributable to identified working conditions may amount to knowledge, particularly where it leads the claimant to seek advice about a compensation claim. A claimant who remains genuinely uncertain and requires expert confirmation may lack knowledge until confirmation is obtained. Seeking legal or medical advice is not an automatic rule determining the date of knowledge. Once time has begun to run, adverse advice does not suspend it. In a hard case, the appropriate remedy may be the discretionary power under Limitation Act 1980, section 33.

The claimant brought a personal injury claim arising from alleged exposure to dust and chemicals at work. The defendant argued that the claim was statute-barred under sections 11 and 14 of the Limitation Act 1980.

HH Judge Ansell held that the relevant date of knowledge was January 1994, but exercised the discretion under section 33 to allow the claim to proceed. The defendant appealed, challenging both the date of knowledge and the section 33 decision. The central issues were when the claimant first knew that he had a significant injury attributable to the defendant’s acts or omissions, and whether it was equitable to disapply the limitation provisions.

1. Appeal dismissed. The court disagreed with the judge’s date of knowledge but upheld the decision that the claim should proceed under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980.
2. Under sections 11 and 14, the date of knowledge is a question of fact. The court must identify when the claimant first knew the relevant facts, including that the injury was significant and was attributable in fact to the defendant’s act or omission. Section 14(3) introduces constructive knowledge, assessed by reference to facts the claimant could reasonably have obtained or inferred.
3. The authorities distinguish between a claimant with a firm belief that he has a significant injury attributable to identified working conditions, sufficiently firm to justify seeking advice about a compensation claim, and a claimant who remains uncertain and considers expert confirmation necessary before knowing that the injury is a real possibility. The former has knowledge; the latter may not.
4. Seeking legal advice does not automatically establish knowledge, and adverse expert advice does not necessarily prevent knowledge where the claimant’s own belief is sufficiently firm. The issue remains the claimant’s state of knowledge in the circumstances. On the facts, the claimant’s knowledge of significant injury arose in April 1989, when his persistent and severe symptoms led him to consult his general practitioner. His earlier symptoms were not shown to involve a firm belief in a significant injury.
5. Section 33 required consideration of the delay, its reasons, the cogency of the evidence, the defendant’s conduct, promptness, and the steps taken to obtain advice. The claimant had made reasonable efforts to obtain medical and legal advice, while the defendant’s resistance to disclosure delayed identification of the relevant substance. The alleged evidential prejudice was not substantial, and the claim was not shown to be weak or of little value. It was therefore equitable to direct that sections 11 and 14 should not apply.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the defendant’s appeal and upheld the direction that the limitation provisions should not apply.
• Luton County Court: HH Judge Ansell, on 27 July 1999, held that the claim was out of time but exercised the discretion under section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to allow it to proceed.