Ludlow v National Power Plc

A trial judge must give reasons sufficient to show the parties why they have won or lost and to enable appellate scrutiny. There are no absolute requirements as to the form or extent of reasons. Their adequacy is assessed in the context of the issues, evidence and the parties’ familiarity with the case. A judge may prefer one expert opinion where the judgment, read as a whole, makes the reasons for that preference sufficiently clear. An appellate court will not interfere where the judge’s conclusions were open on the evidence.

The claimant appealed against the quantum of damages awarded by the Mayor’s and City of London Court for injuries sustained in an employment accident. Liability was admitted, and the trial judge awarded damages for short-term physical symptoms but rejected the claimant’s later claim that the accident caused post-traumatic stress disorder or depression.

The claimant contended that the judge had given inadequate reasons for rejecting the psychiatric evidence, relying on Flannery & Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Limited [2000] 1 All ER 373. The central issue was whether the reasons were legally adequate and whether the judge was entitled to prefer the defendant’s psychiatric evidence.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Court upheld the trial judge’s award and his rejection of the psychiatric element of the claim.

2. Lord Justice Henry accepted the general principles stated in Flannery & Flannery v Halifax Estate Agencies Limited [2000] 1 All ER 373: fairness requires reasons which leave the parties in no real doubt why they succeeded or failed, and reasons enable an appellate court to understand how the decision was reached. Those principles do not impose absolute rules. The adequacy of reasons must be assessed in the context of the facts and issues known to the parties.

3. Read in that context, the trial judge’s judgment left no real doubt about the basis for rejecting the psychiatric claim. The judge considered the late diagnosis and amendment, the absence of earlier psychiatric symptoms, the uncertainty surrounding the cause of the claimant’s depression, and the conflicting evidence of Dr Alun Jones and Dr Cutting.

4. The judge was entitled to prefer Dr Cutting’s evidence. The evidence supported his conclusions that the accident was not sufficiently violent or terrifying to trigger PTSD, that Dr Jones’s experience was concentrated at the extreme end of trauma cases, and that the DSM diagnostic method was vulnerable to over-generalisation and dependence on the claimant’s reliability. The judge’s reference to differences in the experts’ experience adequately conveyed these reasons.

5. The judge was entitled to reach those conclusions on the evidence. Lord Justices Potter and Wall agreed. The stay was lifted and costs were ordered against the appellant, subject to the stated legal-aid and assessment directions.

• Mayor’s and City of London Court: On 4 May 1999, His Honour Judge Simpson awarded £3,050 damages and £336 interest for the physical injuries, rejecting liability for the claimant’s later psychiatric problems.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): The appeal was dismissed. The trial judgment was upheld.