Konan v Secretary of State for the Home Department

In an asylum appeal, additional country material justifies interference with an immigration tribunal’s decision only where it could materially affect the assessment of the individual claimant’s future risk. Evidence concerning different persons, such as prominent leaders of a student organisation, may have little or no relevance to a claimant who was not a member or leader of that organisation. Past persecution does not necessarily establish a continuing well-founded fear where country conditions have materially changed. A tribunal is not at fault for failing to address alleged future political activity unsupported by evidence.

The appellant, an Ivorian national, had made successive asylum claims after alleging detention and torture arising from his political activity in 1995. The Secretary of State refused his claim, and a special adjudicator dismissed his appeal.

The Immigration Appeal Tribunal accepted that he had previously suffered politically motivated mistreatment, but concluded that the changed situation in the Ivory Coast meant that he no longer had a well-founded fear of persecution. The appellant argued that the Tribunal had wrongly relied on an amnesty, and that the Secretary of State should have disclosed a June 1999 update to the country assessment concerning student unrest and the treatment of FESCI supporters.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal was entitled to conclude that the appellant no longer had a well-founded fear of persecution in the Ivory Coast in respect of his 1995 activities. The evidence showed a material change in circumstances, including the release of known political prisoners and detainees.
2. The amnesty evidence did not provide a sufficient basis for interfering with the Tribunal’s conclusion. Although the appellant had not been convicted or charged, it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to infer that persons who had displeased the government without being charged would also benefit from the change in policy.
3. The additional June 1999 country material did not demonstrate that the appellant personally faced a continuing risk. It concerned student unrest and the firm governmental response to it. The appellant was not a member or prominent leader of FESCI and had not participated in the 1999 student protests.
4. The decision in ABC and D v Secretary of State for the Home Department did not assist the appellant. That case concerned prominent FESCI leaders and therefore did not determine the risk faced by this appellant.
5. The Tribunal had considered whether the appellant might be persecuted because of past official interest in him or his wife. There was no evidence of his likely future political activities, so the Tribunal could not be criticised for failing to address that unsupported possibility.
6. Simon Brown LJ observed that, if undisclosed material could have made a sensible difference to the assessment, the Secretary of State’s disclosure obligation described in R v Special Adjudicator ex parte Kerrouche [1998] INLR 88 might have been engaged, and might be higher in a full asylum appeal than in safe-third-country cases such as R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Abdi and Gawe [1996] 1 WLR 298. The point did not arise for decision because the material could not have made a material difference here.

Lady Justice Hale agreed with the judgments of Sir Christopher Staughton and Simon Brown LJ. The appeal was dismissed, with a legal aid assessment of the appellant’s costs.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal dismissed.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: accepted that the appellant had previously suffered politically motivated mistreatment but dismissed his appeal after finding that changed conditions meant he no longer had a well-founded fear of persecution.
• Special adjudicator: dismissed the appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of asylum.