Samuel Smith Old Brewery (Tadcaster) v North Yorkshire County Council

A traffic regulation order may lawfully be made preventively where the authority considers it expedient to prevent the likelihood of danger arising. The authority need not assume that the proposed activity will not occur merely because the activity could not safely or practically proceed without the order. The existence of a separate planning power under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 does not impliedly restrict the highway authority’s powers under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984, even where the order also serves planning objectives.

The appellant brewery challenged a traffic regulation order made by the respondent highway authority under section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. The order restricted vehicles on parts of Kirkgate and Westgate during the Thursday market and suspended a one-way system to preserve access.

The market was intended to relocate from a car park onto the highway pursuant to planning permission granted by the local planning authority. The brewery argued that section 1 could not apply because the danger would arise only if the order were made and the market proceeded. It also argued that the authority was required to use the separate procedure under section 249 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The Administrative Court refused judicial review, and the brewery appealed.

1. Appeal dismissed. The order was within the powers conferred by section 1 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.
2. Per Lord Justice Pill, section 1(1)(a) expressly permits action to prevent the likelihood of danger arising. The reference to avoiding danger also contemplates preventive action. The authority need not wait until a development is complete before making a traffic regulation order, even where the development could not proceed safely or practically without it.
3. The relevant question was whether it appeared expedient to make the order for preventing the likelihood of danger. Per Lord Justice Buxton, the authority was not required to reason on the basis that refusal of the order would prevent the market and therefore prevent any danger. That approach would improperly fetter the statutory discretion.
4. The existence of section 249 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 did not limit section 1 of the 1984 Act. The powers overlapped, but the 1990 Act contained no express prohibition on using traffic regulation powers where planning objectives were also involved. Section 249 involved different decision-makers and safeguards, and did not circumscribe the highway authority’s powers. Section 122 of the 1984 Act supported the generality of those powers.
5. The court was concerned only with the legal question whether the order fell within the statutory powers, not with the unresolved practical consequences of implementing the planning permission. Lord Justice Thorpe agreed with the reasons of Lord Justice Pill.

Costs were awarded to the respondents in the sum stated in the order, and leave to appeal was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the decision of Mr Justice Maurice Kay dated 19 April 2000 refusing the application to quash the traffic regulation order. Appeal dismissed.