Rightgrove Ltd v Sedgefield Borough Council

Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success. An appellate court does not rehear factual disputes; review is limited to whether findings were against the weight of the evidence. Under the Housing Act 1985, section 265(1) does not confine the authority to considering the subject property alone when deciding whether demolition is the most satisfactory course. Practical consequences involving adjoining properties may be relevant. The temporal restriction in section 22(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998 cannot be bypassed by relying on section 6 against the appellate court’s review of an earlier order.

Sedgefield Borough Council made demolition orders concerning two properties owned by Rightgrove Ltd. Rightgrove accepted that the properties were unfit for human habitation but disputed the repair and demolition assessments and the proposed course of action. Its appeal to Middlesborough County Court was unsuccessful. Rightgrove then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. The application concerned the construction of section 265(1) of the Housing Act 1985 and whether Article 1 of the First Protocol could be relied on under sections 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998, despite the transitional restriction in section 22(4).

Lady Justice Arden dismissed the application for leave to appeal. The proposed grounds had no real prospect of success.

1. Factual findings. The challenge to the County Court’s assessment of repair costs and the prospects of sale was not pursued in open court. In any event, it would not have provided a reasonable prospect of success. The Court of Appeal would not rehear the facts. Its review would be limited to whether the County Court’s findings were against the weight of the evidence it had heard.
2. Construction of section 265(1). The requirement that demolition be the most satisfactory course of action was expressed in general terms. It did not require the local housing authority to consider the subject property in isolation. A subject-property-only assessment would be artificial. The authority could take account of adjoining properties and realistic arrangements for joint repair or demolition where those matters affected the comparative costs and practical outcome.
3. Human rights argument. Article 1 of the First Protocol was relied on as protecting the owner’s possessions. Section 22(4), however, prevented reliance on section 7(1)(b) in proceedings commenced by the applicant concerning an act before the relevant provision came into force. The fact that the Council was a public authority did not alter that conclusion.
4. Section 6. Section 6 could not be used to circumvent section 22(4). The Court of Appeal, when considering permission and the appeal itself, was reviewing the County Court’s order. It was not acting in a way that independently engaged section 6 in relation to the earlier demolition orders. Any other construction would undermine section 22(4).

Application dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 12 December 2000, Lady Justice Arden dismissed Rightgrove’s application for leave to appeal.
• Middlesborough County Court: His Honour Judge Bowers heard the matter on 23 June 2000 and the applicant’s appeal against the demolition orders was unsuccessful.