De Montford v McKenzie

Appellate proceedings should ordinarily bring litigation to an end at the earliest point consistent with justice. That principle has particular force in family proceedings marked by hostility, dishonesty and disregard of procedural rules. The Court of Appeal will not undertake an elaborate review of proposed fresh evidence where the litigation has been conducted abusively and further proceedings would not serve justice. Costs orders are matters of judicial discretion and will rarely be disturbed where the first-instance judge has explained the balance of relevant considerations. Applications for injunctive relief should generally be directed to the trial court unless permission to appeal has first been granted.

The applicant, Angela Olive De Montford, sought permission to appeal and an extension of time against an order made by Connell J on 14 July 2000 in ancillary-relief proceedings arising from the termination of a 14-year marriage. She also sought leave to adduce fresh evidence and injunctive relief.

The first-instance judge had made serious findings about dishonesty and non-disclosure by both parties and had ordered the wife to pay two-thirds of the husband's costs. The central issues were whether the proposed additional evidence justified appellate intervention or a retrial, whether the costs order should be disturbed, and whether the Court of Appeal should entertain an injunction application.

1. Applications refused. The Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal, together with the related applications for an extension of time, leave to adduce fresh evidence and injunctive relief.
2. There is a general principle that litigation should end at the earliest date consistent with justice. That principle is especially strong in family proceedings. It has particular force where the parties have disregarded the rules and requirements of litigation and have used dishonest means in pursuing their cases.
3. In those circumstances, it would be inappropriate to prolong the proceedings by undertaking an elaborate appellate examination of proposed additional evidence, including whether it satisfied the rule in Ladd v Marshall, whether it should be admitted and whether a retrial should be ordered.
4. Costs adjudications are essentially matters of judicial discretion. Connell J had explained the competing considerations, including the husband's lack of candour and deliberate non-disclosure despite obtaining a lump-sum order without a responsible prior offer. The Court of Appeal would not interfere with the resulting order that he recover only two-thirds of his costs.
5. Any application for an injunction was properly directed to the trial court. The Court of Appeal would not ordinarily determine such matters unless the case had been accepted for entry into the appellate process by the grant of permission.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): refused permission to appeal from the order of Connell J dated 14 July 2000, and declined the associated applications.
• High Court sitting at Chester: made the order in ancillary-relief proceedings, including the costs order challenged in the Court of Appeal.