Revenko v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A stateless person is not a refugee under article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951 merely because he is outside, and cannot return to, his country of former habitual residence. He must also have a present well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention ground.

Article 1A(2) is to be construed as a whole, in its treaty context and in light of the Convention’s purpose. A literal reading that creates a more favourable category for stateless persons is displaced by that purposive construction. The court may also treat the relationship between articles 1A(2) and 33 as supporting that conclusion, although that point was not necessary to the result.

The appellant, a stateless man born in Moldova, claimed asylum in the United Kingdom. The Special Adjudicator found that he was stateless. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal, by a majority decision notified on 8 September 1999, found that he could not return to Moldova but had no well-founded fear of persecution there for a Convention ground.

With leave of the Tribunal, he appealed to the Court of Appeal. He contended that a stateless person who was unable to return to the country of former habitual residence was, for that reason alone, a refugee under article 1A(2) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, as modified by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1967.

The central issue was whether inability to return alone could confer refugee status on a stateless person.

1. Appeal dismissed unanimously. Lord Justice Pill, Lord Justice Clarke and Mr Justice Bennett held that article 1A(2) imposes a single test for refugee status. A stateless person must establish a present well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. Statelessness and inability to return to the country of former habitual residence do not alone suffice.

2. Lord Justice Pill held that the article must be read as a whole. Its opening requirement of a well-founded fear governs both nationals and stateless persons. The Convention was not intended to establish two fundamentally different categories of refugee or to give stateless persons broader protection than persons with a nationality.

3. Lord Justice Clarke accepted that the appellant’s reading was the stronger literal reading. However, applying the broad and purposive approach to treaty interpretation endorsed in Adan v Home Secretary [1999] 1 AC 293, he concluded that it was inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Convention. The surrounding international materials, the UNHCR Handbook and the absence of evidence of contrary state practice supported the requirement of a Convention-based fear.

4. Mr Justice Bennett likewise held that a whole-text and purposive construction prevailed over a literal division of the sentence at the semicolon. The appellant had failed to establish the required fear, and no further factual findings could alter the result.

5. Lord Justice Pill and Lord Justice Clarke further considered that article 33 could shed light on article 1A(2), since refugee status without protection against refoulement would be anomalous. Mr Justice Bennett considered himself bound by Adan to leave that consideration aside. The point was supportive only and did not affect the dismissal.

• Court of Appeal: Dismissed the appellant’s appeal from the Immigration Appeal Tribunal.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: By a majority decision notified on 8 September 1999, upheld the refusal of asylum. It accepted that the appellant was stateless and unable to return to Moldova, but found no well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention ground.
• Special Adjudicator: Found the appellant stateless and found that he had not established a well-founded fear of persecution in Moldova for a Convention ground.